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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN SPAIN




Recent events have amplified the perennial question of the
proper role of religion in American society, politics, and the law. In
the 2000 presidential election, then-Governor George W. Bush and
Senator Joseph Lieberman, in particular, emphasized their faith and
the role it played in their daily lives.' President Bush has been a force-
ful proponent of faith-based initiative programs in which the federal
government subsidizes and aids religious groups who provide charita-
ble services to society.2 Just recently, the Supreme Court decided
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris3 and upheld an Ohio program that provided
vouchers to families in the Cleveland City School District, which could
be used at private schools, including religious and parochial schools. 4
The plaintiffs had argued that the vouchers were unconstitutional
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2003; A.B. Dartmouth
College, 2000. I would like to thank Professor Paolo Carozza for the many helpful
suggestions he gave me during the course of drafting this Note. My parents, Mike and
Chris, and my sister, Molly, have been of immeasurable support during my whole time
at Notre Dame. I am indebted to the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
editing work on this Note. I must also thank Laurel Sink, Joe Shimek, Keith
Alexander, Tom Van Gilder, and Bruce Khula for their constant support and
friendship. Finally, thanks must go to Patti Ogden and Dwight King for their research
help during the writing of this Note.
1 See, e.g., On the Religious-Political Trail, 117 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1032 (2000);
M.W. Guzy, Lieberman, the Un-Clinton, Should Lighten Up, ST. Louis DIsPATcH, Sept. 20,
2000, at B7; James M. Klurfeld, Convention 2000 The Democrats: Candidates Blurring
Church-State Line, NEWSDAY, Aug. 16, 2000, at A37.
2 See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker, Lieberman Joins Bush Bid To Push Aid-to-Charity Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at Al 1.
3 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
4 See id. at 244-46.
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under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 5 The
questions about the proper role of religion in society come against the
backdrop of a nation which, by all accounts, is incredibly religious. 6
Yet at the same time, the constitutional framework which safeguards
and protects the freedom of religion has become in recent years con-
fused, and in some eyes, directly or indirectly conflicts with the foun-
dational American understandings of religious liberty and more
generally with a proper understanding of what that liberty means in
principle and practice. 7
Whereas the American constitutional order aims to protect the
free exercise of religion,8 partially by prohibiting any state establish-
ment of religion, the current legal framework, which minimizes both
the protections of the Free Exercise Clause and the possible collabora-
tion between the state and religious bodies proposes a paltry vision
of religious freedom. Fundamentally, this means that the American
vision of religious liberty is a minimalist one that sees religious liberty
in strictly negative terms, ultimately privatizes religion, and, thereby,
undermines the very goals that religious liberty hopes to foster. At the
same time, if law is in some sense rhetoric that tells a story, 10 Ameri-
can law is telling a very poisonous story about religious liberty. While
formally endorsing religious freedom, the American constitutional re-
gime tells a contradictory story about the value it places upon religion
and religiously motivated activity.
To demonstrate these assertions, I will bring the American ap-
proach to religious liberty into conversation with the Spanish experi-
ence of religious liberty. In particular, I will examine Spanish
5 See id. ("The question presented is whether this program offends the Establish-
ment Clause of the United States Constitution."); see alsoJacques Steinberg, Cleveland
Case Poses New Test for Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at Al.
6 According to one survey, 95% of Americans believe in God, 85% of Americans
are Christian, and 7% of Americans identify with a non-Christian faith. Barna Re-
search Group, Beliefs: General Religious, at http://www.barna.org/cgi-bin/PageCate
gory.asp?CategorylD=2 (last visited Mar. 24, 2003).
7 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme
Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REv. 259, 260 (describing Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990), "as substantively wrong and institutionally irresponsible"); Michael
W. McConnell, Neutrality, Separation and Accommodation: Tensions in American First
Amendment Doctrine, in LAW AND RELIGION 63-74 (RexJ. Ahdar ed., 2000) (describing
the confused and incoherent nature of American religious liberty law); Steven D.
Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. I.. REV.
149, 149 (1991) (arguing that the "intelligent constitutional commitment to religious
freedom that once existed in this country has deteriorated").
8 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
9 See infra notes 211-53 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 335-38 and accompanying text.
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protections of religious liberty and compare them to those of the
United States in order to draw out important distinctions. One of the
main contrasts will be that Spain achieves a more robust understand-
ing of the freedom of religion, seeing it as something that requires
positive governmental support. Moreover, Spain recognizes the social
dimensions of religion, understanding religion not only as a sociologi-
cal fact, but as a communal reality with social and cultural implica-
tions. In the United States, a, more individualistic and private notion
of religion exists that misses many of the insights of the Spanish ap-
proach.1 ' Though the United States cannot adopt the Spanish model,
it nevertheless can learn from the Spanish experience and see its in-
sights as inspirations leading toward a fuller vision of the freedom of
religion.
Because all law is contextual,' 2 this discussion necessitates more
than a simple description of the constitutional provisions or legisla-
tion that exists. concerning religious liberty in both countries. Thus,
my description of the legal approaches in each country is placed
within its historical, political, and social context. Religious liberty law
makes no sense apart from the historical and foundational principles
that were the guiding force behind its very incarnation. Therefore, in
this Note, I spend a considerable amount of time attempting to de-
scribe the understanding of religious liberty in each country.
Part I begins with a description of the long and often tortured
Spanish experience with religious liberty. In Parts I.F and I.G, I ana-
lyze Spain's modern constitution and the legislative enactment that
fleshed out the constitution's protections. Then in Part I.H, I evaluate
the problems and developments that have arisen since the Spanish
Constitution's enactment. Part II discusses the American constitu-
tional experience with religious liberty. I first examine the historical
and political milieu surrounding the framing of the First Amendment.
Then, in Part II.D, I discuss the modern development of the religion
clauses and attempt to describe the law as it now stands. After laying
out both systems, Part III brings the two systems into conversation in
order to show the shortcomings in the current American approach to
religious liberty law.
11 See infra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
12 MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 11 (2d ed. 1994)
(arguing that one cannot understand the function of various legal rules and systems
without "situating them in their legal, economic, and cultural context").
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I. SPANISH RELIGIOUS LIBERTY LAW
A. An Introduction
Article 16 of the Spanish Constitution, which was ratified in 1978,
states,
1. Freedom of ideology, religion, and worship of individual and
comminities is guaranteed, with no other restriction on their ex-
pression than may be necessary to maintain public order as pro-
tected by law.
2. Nobody may be compelled to make statements regarding his
religion, beliefs, or ideology.
3. There shall be no State religion. The public authorities shall
take the religious beliefs of Spanish society into account and shall in
consequence maintain appropriate co-operation with the Catholic
Church and the other confessions.' 3
These provisions of the Spanish Constitution are a ringing en-
dorsement of religious freedom and a guarantee of that freedom in
law. Like all law, these provisions cannot be viewed abstractly; rather,
they must be viewed within the context of Spanish culture and his-
tory-a culture and history that have, to say the least, not always been
friendly to the rights of persons to worship and believe in freedom . 4
As one observer of the Spanish situation has written, "An understand-
ing of contemporary church-state relations in Spain requires ... [an]
historical review."'15 This historical review is necessary because Span-
ish history allows us to see the influences behind the 1978 Constitu-
tion and the dangers inherent when religious freedom is not
guaranteed. Spain's tortured history of religious liberty and the re-
sponse to this history also offer the observer a decidedly different re-
sponse than the American response.
B. From 589 A.D. to the Nineteenth Century
To begin understanding the contemporary nature of religious lib-
erty law in Spain, one must return to 589 A.D., when the Spanish state
became formally aligned with the Roman Catholic Church. It was in
13 LA CONSTITucION ESPAIOLA [C.E.] art. 16, §§ 1-3 (Spain), reprinted in MINIS-
TERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 28 (Alberto de la Hera
& Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes eds., 1998).
14 See, e.g., Daniel Basterra Montserrat, The Constitutional Development of Religious
Freedom in Spain: An HistoricalAnalysis, 4J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 27 (1995) ("Un-
fortunately, even Spanish constitutional history is replete with examples of religious
intolerance.").
15 Gloria M. Mordn, The Spanish System of Church and State, 1995 BYU L. REv. 535,
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that year that the king "proclaimed the religious (Catholic) and politi-
cal unity of his Kingdom at the Council of Toledo."' 6 This alignment
of the Spanish kingdom with the Catholic' religion did not, however,
necessarily lead to gross religious intolerance. In fact, before the Prot-
estant Reformation, "the political and religious conditions in Spain
were unique among the other countries of Europe."17 Spain was
unique because, within its borders, the three Abrahamic religions-
that is, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam-met and entered into crea-
tive dialogue. As one scholar notes, the Spanish cities of Toledo and
Cordoba "were true lights that lit up all of Europe.""' In fact,
"[w]ithin these cities' walls was an impressive forum of interchange,
growth and hope, in which learned men, scientists and humanists
gathered and unified. The three cultures and religions were able to
coexist, all but unheard of during that time."' 9
At the same time, the experience of the Spanish Jews illustrates
that this religious tolerance was always in tension with the counter-
vailing force of religious absolutism. While the Jews "were historically
permitted to faithfully practice their religion" in certain sections of
Spain, this "permission was never long-lasting."20 Thus, it seems that
the situation on the ground oscillated between a far-reaching freedom
of worship and terrible repression of religious plurality. In 1391, the
Spanish massacred the Jews mercilessly.2' And a short "century later,
with the taking of Granada, the Catholic kings in that city signed a far-
reaching expulsion decree of all Jews who did not renounce their re-
ligion and embrace Catholicism." 22
With the advent of Protestantism, Spain became "the principal
bulwark against the Reformation."2 3 The Spanish experience of relig-
ious liberty during this period is best personified by Torquemada, "a
destructive man for whom there was only one way of understanding
the relationship of man with God."2 4 In short, though Spain had
shown great promise in allowing religious freedom at various times
during these years, "intolerance and persecution predominated the
mainstream culture." 25 Another scholar states that the "novelty" of
16 Id.
17 Montserrat, supra note 14, at 28.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 29.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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the Spanish encounter with religion "involved Spain's exclusion of dis-
sidents from Spanish territory and, perhaps, the royal zeal for relig-
ious reform."2'
Though these short few paragraphs can hardly do justice to the
early Spanish experience of religious liberty, they do indicate that the
Spanish understanding of religion and religious freedom was often
contradictory, showing aspects of great tolerance mixed 27 with horri-
ble instances of intolerance. At the same time, all of this history must
be seen within the context that Spain was a confessional state through-
out this period, proclaiming one true religion, namely Catholicism, to
the exclusion of all others. 28
C. The Nineteenth Century
In this historical foray through the Spanish understanding of
freedom of religion, we can next focus our energies on the nineteenth
century. Enlightenment thought and the philosophies of the French
Revolution influenced the Spanish Constitutional Convention of
1812.29 Though Enlightenment principles affected the delegates to
the Convention on a whole host of issues, these principles "were com-
pletely ignored in religious affairs. '"" Though a progressive priest
presided over the delegates,3 1 they did not care, or did not desire, to
break free of the Spanish history of state alliance with religion and
religious intolerance. At the beginning of the constitution was "an
invocation to the Trinity," and other provisions of the constitution re-
26 Jos6 Antonio Souto Paz, Perspectives on Religious Freedom in Spain, 2001 BYU L.
Rv. 669, 674.
27 Professor Montserrat has given further examples of notions of religious toler-
ance within the Spanish historical context. Among these are the fact that King Al-
fonso VI declared himself the king of two religions, another king included the history
of all three Abrahamic religions in his personal history, and Francisco de Vitoria "de-
fended the idea that 'infidels' who had not had the opportunity to learn the Christian
faith had not committed the sin of infidelity" and "held the view of not forcing the
infidels to profess the Catholic faith." Montserrat, supra note 14, at 31.
28 It must also be noted that Catholic teaching was still centuries away from devel-
oping a richer, fuller, and ultimately more authentic understanding of religious lib-
erty and the necessity of this liberty to the full and free development of the human
person. This development would occur at the Second Vatican Council. See infra Part
III.A.
29 See Paz, supra note 26, at 675 (describing the Enlightenment philosophies that
influenced the drafters of the 1812 Constitution).
30 Id. at 676.
31 Montserrat, supra note 14, at 35 (noting that Father Diego Mufioz Torrero,
who presided over the drafting commission of the Constitution, was considered a "lib-
eral priest").
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quired Catholic Mass to be said before certain electoral meetings.
32
But the most significant provision was Article 12, "which declared that
Catholicism 'is and will perpetually be [the religion] of the Spanish
nation,"' which stated that the state must "protect it 'by just and wise
laws,"' and which mandated that the laws must prohibit the "'exercise
of any other'" religion.33 The Cadiz Constitution, as it was called 
34
was then hardly an expression of typical Enlightenment sentiments of
free thought and free conscience. Rather, the delegates "established a
strict regime of religious intolerance. '3 5 Spain was unable to escape
the demons of its past.
Spain continued to suffer under the spell of these demons, show-
ing ever-so-slight signs of recovery throughout the course of the nine-
teenth century, explicitly reiterating the "state's establishment of
Catholicism ... in the Constitutions of 1845 and 1876"36 and implic-
itly reiterating this establishment in 1837 and 1869.37 Though it
might be more accurate to describe the Constitution of 1837 as mak-
ing strides toward religious freedom, the Constitution of 1837 was
"limited to describing" the social "reality" that Catholicism was the re-
ligion of Spain and the "precept that prohibited the exercise of an-
other form of worship disappeared."3  Nevertheless, this
development disappeared with the next Constitution of 1845, which
"inhibited rather than enhanced the current state of religious af-
fairs."'3 9 The liberalizing trend returned with the subsequent Constitu-
tion of 1869. Though the State was still "bound to support the
worship and ministers of the Catholic religion," there was a new recog-
nition of religious liberty.41 Non-Catholic foreigners and Spaniards
were granted freedom of worship. 41 With this development non-Cath-
olic worship and practice returned to Spain. 42 This freedom of exer-
cise was short-lived, however. Seven years later, the Constitution
32 Id. at 35-36. It should be noted that some attendees of the Constitutional
Convention thought that the invocation of the Trinity was not itself explicitly Catholic
enough. See id. at 35.
33 Id. at 35-36.
34 See id. at 34.
35 Paz, supra note 26, at 678.
36 Id. at 676.
37 Id. at 676.
38 Montserrat, supra. note 14, at 37.
39 Id. at 38.
40 d. at 39.
41 Id.
42 Id. In fact, the "first synod of the Spanish Reformed Church began in Seville
on July 15, 1869." Id.
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regressed, continuing to ensure freedom of belief, but forbidding any
non-Catholic ceremonies or public demonstrations. 43
D. 1931-The Second Republic
The monarchy, which had ruled Spain for fifty-five years, fell in
1931. 44 With the fall of the monarchy, a Republic was put into
place. 45 Religion again played a central role in the national discus-
sions over how to order the Spanish state. 46 The forces that won the
day favored a radical "laicism" of society. 47 As Paz has written, "laicism
should not be confused with the separation of church and state." 48
Rather, laicism was a policy by which religion was severely privatized;
the state caused religion to "cease [ to exist as a public issue" and
"reduc[ed] religion to a purely individual and private matter.' 49
Whereas the Spanish state had previously been aligned with the Cath-
olic Church, it now took an incredibly hostile stance toward all relig-
ion. All "religious groups were subject to a special law" that allowed
the State to disband or dissolve any organizations that threatened
"state security," required all such groups to be registered with the gov-
ernment, and forbade such groups from owning or obtaining prop-
erty-except property "designated for the groups' upkeep and special
needs. ' 51 1 Additionally, such religious groups were subject to the
Spanish tax laws and forbidden from "engag[ing] in industrial, com-
mercial, or proselytizing activities," and their property was subject to
nationalization. 5' The scope of the anti-religious propositions did not
end there. TheJesuits were dissolved by a constitutional provision for-
bidding religious orders with any "vow of obedience to any power
43 Id. at 40.
44 Id.
45 See id. The First Spanish Republic lasted for a year from 1873 when King
Amadeo abdicated the throne until December 1874 when the army declared Alfonso
XII king. The monarch again ruled from 1875 through 1931. See HENRY KAMEN, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF SPAIN 135-37 (1974) (describing the rise and fall of the First
Spanish Republic and the Restoration of the Monarchy); see also PETER PIERSON, TIlE
HISTORY OF SPAIN 106-09 (discussing the First Republic and its demise).
46 See Montserrat, supra note 14, at 40 (stating that the "issue of religion again
cause deep divisions both in the Parliamentary assembly and throughout the
country").
47 See Paz, supra note 26, at 680.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 683; see also Montserrat, supra note 14, at 41.
51 See Montserrat, supra note 14, at 41; Paz, supra note 26, at 683.
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other than the State. '52 Finally, public religious demonstrations and
expressions were allowed only with state permission. 5- And though
"freedom of conscience and the right to profess and freely practice
whatever religion ' 54 was still protected under Spanish law, this protec-
tion was without much content in light of the above provisions and
limitations.
E. Franco's Regime
The Second Republic's reign was short. In 1936, the Spanish
Civil War began largely because of "popular dissatisfaction with the
government's approach to church-state relations." 55 At the end of the
war, in 1939, General Francisco Franco and his supporters emerged
victorious. In place of the disestablishment and "freedom of con-
science" promised under the Second Republic, Franco's regime rees-
tablished the Catholic Church as the state religion, granted "moderate
religious tolerance," and allowed "limited private, non-Catholic wor-
ship. '56 Whereas the previous regime had been characterized by a
deep anticlericalism, this new regime was characterized by a new cleri-
calism.5 7 The Church and state interacted in a symbiotic relationship
in which the state received "privileges in religious matters" and the
Catholic Church received privileges "in the political arena."58 Among
the Church's privileges was the ability to nullify "laws or judicial deci-
sions that did not comport with Catholic doctrine. ''59 Within this new
establishment relationship, the religious beliefs of non-Catholics were
still permitted, but they were utterly confined to the private sphere.
The Sixth Article of the Fundamental Laws6° stated that, "No one shall
be disturbed as a result of their religious beliefs in the private exercise
of their worship; beliefs or external expressions other than the Catholic
religion shall not be permitted."61
52 Paz, supra note 26, at 684 (quoting C.E. art. 26 (1931) (Spain)); see also
Montserrat, supra note 14, at 41.
53 Montserrat, supra note 14, at 42.
54 Id. at 41.
55 Mordn, supra note 15, at 536.
56 Id.; see also Paz, supra note 26, at 685.
57 See Morn, supra note 15, at 536.
58 Paz, supra note 26, at 686.
59 Id.
60 Professor Montserrat argues that one cannot accurately speak of a Spanish
Constitution at this time. Rather, what existed were certain fundamental laws that
were never approved by a popularly elected legislative body. See Montserrat, supra
note 14, at 42.
61 Id. at 43 (quoting Fundamental Laws) (emphasis added).
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In the second half of the Franco regime, it was the Catholic
Church itself which began the slow process of disentangling the
Church from the state. The Second Vatican Council reinvigorated
the Church's own understanding of church-state relations. 62 In the
wake of the Council, the Catholic Church generally "demanded au-
tonomy and independence from civil powers" and also demanded the
recognition of religious freedom as a basic human right.63 This
brought about the 1967 Spanish Law of Religious Freedom, which
granted "religious freedom to non-Catholic faiths."'64 At the same
time, the Catholic Church still "retained" its "privileged legal status. '" 65
Though tensions still existed between the Church and the state and
much still needed to be worked out between the two institutions and
the manner in which religious freedom would be protected, the stage
had been set for further and deeper developments in the law of relig-
ious freedom. In some sense, it seems that this development necessi-
tated a conjunction of aims on the part of the state and Catholic
Church. In the past, the Catholic Church had fought strongly for re-
ligious freedom where its own interests had been threatened. Now, it
had placed its moral authority squarely behind the idea of religious
freedom; it would take but a few short years for the state to catch up.
F The Constitution of 1978
With the death of General Franco in 1975, a "period of political
transition" ensued, culminating in the 1978 Spanish Constitution. 66
One commentator has described this constitution as having "deeply
reformed the Spanish legal system and recognized the fundamental
right of religious freedom in a country free of an established
church.'67 The framers of this constitution felt influences to expand
the protections of religious freedom both from within Spanish society
and from outside the country. 8 The internal influences were several:
one, as mentioned above, was the Catholic Church and its richer un-
derstanding of religious liberty; second, was the historical experience
of the previous years, and even centuries, with its "failed political and
legal solutions (both laicism and the religious state)."69 The external
62 See Paz, supra note 26, at 687.
63 Id. at 687-88.
64 Id. at 688.
65 Morn, sup/nu note 15, at 536.
66 Id. at 537.
67 i.
68 Paz, supra note 26, at 689.
69 I.
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influences included various United Nations documents and the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.7t0
One additional internal influence that had a profound effect
upon the drafting of the 1978 Constitution was an agreement reached
between the Spanish State and the Catholic Church in 1976.71 The
agreement ensured the following: "1) mutual independence of
church and state; 2) healthy collaboration between both institutions;
and 3) recognition of religious freedom as a civil right. '72 The agree-
ment also included a proviso that would "have a decisive influence on
the drafting" and the development of the constitution; namely, the
agreement ensured that the Catholic Church would not be "subject to
a common regulatory system for all religions. '73
These were the various factors and influences the framers consid-
ered as they drafted the modern constitution of Spain. In the original
formulation or draft of the constitution, the framers simply posited a
constitutional regime that negatively protected religious freedom.
The draft of Article 17, the precursor to the current Article 16, stated
that, "1) Freedom of religion and worship, as well as philosophical
and ideological expression, is guaranteed, with the only limitation be-
ing the public order protected by law" and that, "2) No person can be
compelled to declare his or her religious beliefs. ' 74 The subsequent
drafts and then the final draft of the constitution pushed past this
negative conception of religious freedom, to one that was more posi-
tive and cooperative. The second draft added a provision stating that:
"[n]o faith may be designated as the State's own. Public authorities
shall be mindful of Spain's religious groups and will maintain cooper-
ative relationships with all."'75 This innovation shifted "the secular
state from a policy of indifference regarding religious matters to the
role of an attentive observer. '76 That is, the framers constitutionalized
the social fact of religion, requiring the State to take this fact into
account and furthermore, to cooperate with the various religious bod-
70 See id. ("Freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and worship-both individ-
ually and collectively, in public and in private-are all recognized and guaranteed in
these international documents.").
71 Agreement Between the Holy See and the Spanish State, July 28, 1976, Spain-
Vatican (B.O.E. 1976, 230) [hereinafter Agreement]; see Paz, supra note 26, at 690.
72 Paz, supra note 26, at 690. In the provisions of the agreement the state "waived
its privilege to name bishops and the Church waived its privilege to legal exemption."
Id. (citing Agreement, supra note 71, art. I).
73 Paz, supra note 26 at 690.
74 Id. at 691 (quoting C.E. art. 17 (Draft 1977 (Spain)).
75 Id. at 692 (quoting C.E. art. 17 (Draft 1977 (Spain)).
76 Id.
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ies within Spain. 77 It was an innovation reflected in the final text,
which read:
1. Freedom of ideology, religion, and worship of individual and
communities is guaranteed, with no other restriction on their ex-
pression than may be necessary to maintain public order as pro-
tected by law.
2. Nobody may be compelled to make statements regarding his
religion, beliefs, or ideology.
3. There shall be no State religion. The public authorities shall
take the religious beliefs of Spanish society into account and shall in
consequence maintain appropriate co-operation with the Catholic
Church and the other confessions. 78
In late 1978, King Juan Carlos signed the constitution, making it the
law of the land. For Spain this seemed to mark the end of the thorny
"religion question" that had plagued the country for hundreds of
years.79
G. Post-Ratification Developments
1. General Act of Religious Liberty
Though one can unequivocally state that the Spanish "religion
question" was closed by the Constitution of 1978, this constitution-
like all law-raised its own questions of how it was to be interpreted,
implemented, and lived out in the shared social life of Spain. The
constitution simply set in motion a legal framework to which the Span-
ish state would, in subsequent years, need to add substance. The first
of this substance came in the form of the General Act of Religious
Liberty,80 otherwise known as the Organic Law on Religious Freedom,
77 See id.
78 C.E. art. 16, §§ 1-3 (Spain), reprinted in MINISTERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGIS-
LATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 28 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martfnez de Codes
eds., 1998). One should note that the Spanish Constitutional protections apply not
only against the state but also against private actors. Thus the Constitution protects a
general right which private actors must also respect. C.E. art. 9, § I (Spain), reprinted
in MINISTERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 26 (Alberto de
la Hera & Rosa Maria Martfnez de Codes eds., 1998) (stating that "[c]itizens and
public authorities are bound by the Constitution").
79 Paz, supra note 26, at 697.
80 See General Act 7/1980 of 5July of Religious Liberty (B.O.E. 1980, 177) [here-
inafter General Act], reprinted in MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLATION ON RE-
LIGIOUS AFFAIRS 41-46 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martfnez de Codes eds.,
1998).
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which became law in 1980.8I The Act explicates the manner in which
the freedom of religion can be exercised both by individuals and relig-
ious groups82 -it "contemplates the content of the guarantee" of re-
ligious freedom "in its individual and institutional aspects" 83-and,
explicitly, "sets forth with complete clarity the rule of nondiscrimina-
tion for reasons of religious beliefs. '8 4 The Act manifests the constitu-
tion's mandate of cooperation at several points. One provision "to
ensure true and effective application of these rights" requires the state
to "adopt the necessary measures to facilitate assistance at religious
services in public, military, hospital, community, and penitentiary es-
tablishments and any others under its aegis, as well as religious train-
ing in public schools. '85 A second set of provisions allows the state to
set up cooperation agreements with religious bodies that have regis-
tered with the State. 86
These registration and cooperation provisions merit a closer
look. Article 5 "creates a public registry within the Ministry of Justice
in which churches, faiths, and religious communities and their affili-
ates may enroll. '8 7 One of the keys here is that religious groups are
not required to register; "groups may choose instead to enroll in the
common registry for associations." 88 Furthermore, the registry is lim-
ited to "those groups that pursue a 'religious purpose."' 89 The Span-
81 Javier Martinez-Torr6n, Church Autonomy and Religious Liberty in Spain, in
CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 345, 347 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 2001).
82 See General Act, art. II, rqepinted in MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLA-
TION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 41-42 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de
Codes eds., 1998); see also Montserrat, supra note 14, at 46; Paz, supra note 26, at 697.
83 Montserrat, supra note 14, at 46.
84 Id. (describing General Act, art. I, § 2).
85 General Act, art. II, § 3, reprinted in MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLA-
TION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 42 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes
eds., 1998); see also Montserrat, supra note 14, at 46.
86 General Act, arts. V, VII, reprinted in MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLA-
TION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 43-44 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de
Codes eds., 1998).
87 Paz, supra note 26, at 698 (emphasis added); see General Act, art. V, § 1, re-
printed in MINISTERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 43 (Al-
berto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes eds., 1998).
88 Paz, supra note 26, at 698; see General Act, art. VI, § 2, reprinted in MINISTERIO
DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 44 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa
Maria Martinez de Codes eds., 1998). Registration does however have its benefits
including placing the religious entity under the "protective umbrella" of the General
Act. Martinez-Torr6n, supra note 81, at 349.
89 Paz, supra note 26, at 698-99 (quoting General Act, art. V, § 2, reprinted in
MINISTERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 43 (Alberto de la
Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes eds., 1998)). As Paz states and my discussion
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ish State "shall establish as appropriate" cooperation agreements with
religious groups or bodies that have registered and that have obtained
"notorious influence" in Spain "due to their domain or number of
followers." 91 1 Parliament "must then approve all agreements made be-
tween the government and the religious groups."'') This same article
allows these agreements to "confer" tax breaks and benefits to the en-
tities with whom the agreements have been made. 92
At the same time, the General Act in Article 3 also spells out lim-
its to the freedom of religion:
1. The rights deriving from the freedom of worship and religion
may not be exercised to the detriment of the right of other [sic] to
practise their public freedoms and fundamental rights or of public
safety, health and morality, elements which constitute the order en-
sured under the rule of Law in democratic societies.
2. Activities, purposes and Entities relating to or engaging in the
study of and experimentation with psychic or parapsychological
phenomena or the dissemination of humanistic or spiritualistic val-
ues or other similar non-religious aims do not qualify for the protec-
tion provided in this Act.""
Therefore, the General Act is not simply a document granting relig-
ious liberties and spelling out the manner in which the State can and
should cooperate in helping religious entities but rather it sets limits
on the manner in which that freedom rightly can be exercised.
94
below, infra notes 122-35 will show, what constitutes a religious purpose is not an easy
question. Paz, supra note 26 at 699.
90 General Act, art. VII, § 1, reprinted in MINISTERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLA_-
TION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 44 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes
eds., 1998); see a1ho Paz, supra note 26, at 700 (quoting General Act, art. VII).
91 Paz, supra note 26, at 700; see General Act, art. VII, § 1, reprinted in MINISTERIO
DEJUSTICIA, SPANIS-i LEGISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 44 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa
Maria Martinez de Codes eds., 1998)
92 General Act, art. VII, § 2, reprinted in MINISTERIO DEJUSrICIA, SPANISH LEGISLA-
TION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 44 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes
eds., 1998). Such tax benefits are further subject to the "principle of equality," which
means that tax benefits cannot be given to one group with whom an agreement has
been reached to the exclusion of others. Id.
93 Id. art. III, reprinted in MINISTERIO DEJusTICIA, SPANISH LEGIS rION ON RELIG-
iOUS AFFAIRS 42-43 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes eds., 1998).
As Professor Mor~in has asked, this provision raises a serious question: "Can any state
law distinguish religious values from spiritualistic values so that the regulation of hu-
manistic or spiritualistic values does not violate the fundamental right to religious
liberty?" Mor~in, supra note 15, at 539.
94 Some might argue that no such limits can ever be placed upon the exercise of
religious liberty. This however confuses the true nature of religious liberty, which is
not in of itself an absolute human right but one that is subject to certain limits. It is
1688 [VOL. 78:5
2003] RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 1689
2. Agreements with Religious Bodies
In the years since the ratification of the new Spanish Constitution
and the enactment of the General Act on Religious Freedom, the
Spanish government has entered into cooperative agreements with
several different religious entities as provided for in both the General
Act and the Constitution.
The first of these agreements was with the Catholic Church. 95 It
is, in fact, more accurate to describe the agreement with the Catholic
Church as a series of agreements. 96 Because the first of these agree-
ments with the Catholic Church predated the General Act it did not
fall under the auspices of Article 7 of that act.97 In part this means
that the agreements with the Catholic Church have "created certain
[internal] mechanisms for interpreting and applying their content"
apart from the "mechanisms . . . provided in ordinary legislation
about such matters."98 At the same time, this set of agreements with
the Catholic Church are also different from cooperative arrangements
with other religious entities because they are "considered interna-
tional treaties. '9")
Three main issues are addressed by the agreements between the
Catholic Church and the Spanish State. l') The first issue deals with
"U]uridical matters" by which the "state recognizes that each Catholic
entity and institution is a legal organization." 10 1 Included under these
juridical matters are such things as the understanding that Catholic
churches and shrines are sacred, that the Catholic Church can give
aid in public institutions such as hospitals and prisons, and that the
Sabbath and Catholic Holy Days are state holidays. 10 2 The second is-
sue concerns education and cultural affairs. The Spanish government
not always state coercion for a state to prevent someone from acting out certain "relig-
ious" beliefs he might have. It would be coercion if the state attempted to disabuse
that person from his belief. But it is wholly different to suggest that a state's preven-
tion of certain actions in order to promote and ensure the common good (and to
avoid attacks on the rights of others) is a coercive act and therefore a violation of
religious liberty. See SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE
[DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM] 2 (1965) [hereinafter DIGNITATIS HUMANAE]
(stating that the right to religious freedom is to be respected, "provided that just
public order be observed").
95 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
96 Mordn, supra note 15, at 542.
97 See Paz, supra note 26, 702.
98 Id. at 702-03.
99 Mordn, supra note 15, at 542; see also Paz, supra note 26, at 702.
100 Mordn, supra note 15, at 542-43.
101 Id. at 542.
102 See id. at 542-43.
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has agreed to "respect Catholic values in public schools"'' 1 3 and that
"school curricula. . . 'shall include the teaching of the Catholic Relig-
ion in all Educational Centers, [under] conditions comparable to
those of the basic subjects.'"10 4 The Church, not the government, is
the entity responsible for choosing what will be taught in these relig-
ion classes, the teachers who will teach, and the sources used in the
teaching.' 115 The third set of issues that these agreements cover con-
cern state financial support of Catholicism and taxation exemptions.
The Church receives a certain portion of the income tax of those tax-
payers who elect to help support the Catholic Church106 and receives
exemptions from the income tax, as well. 1 1 7
The Spanish government has also reached agreements with three
other religious bodies in the last twenty years. In 1992, the Evangeli-
cal Christian, Jewish, and Islamic communities entered into Article 7
Cooperation agreements. I"" Each of these agreements is basically the
same.' 09 These agreements protect the groups' "places of worship"
and the professional capacities of their ministers, "including the rec-
ognition of confidentiality of facts learned during pastoral activities
and permitting ministers to participate in Spain's Social Security pro-
gram."' 10 In addition, the agreements civilly recognize the marriages
performed in each of the three bodies and grant these religious bod-
ies access to public institutions and organizations such as hospitals,
prisons, and the military."'I Most significant, however, is that these
agreements grant to these religious bodies the same rights granted to
the Catholic Church in the arena of education. Each of the groups is
"guarantee [d] ... access to school grounds as well as the availability of
classrooms for religious instruction under the direction of ministers
103 Jd. at 543.
104 Paz, supra note 26, at 705 (quoting Agreement Concerning Education and Cul-
tural Affairs, art. 2 (B.O.E. 1979, 300), reprinted in MINISTERIO DE JusTiCIA, SPANISH
LEGISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 58 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de
Codes eds., 1998)).
105 See id.
106 See MorAn, supra note 15, at 543; see also Paz, supra note 26, at 703-04.
107 See Mordn, supra note 15, at 543. A fourth minor issue that Professor Mordn
mentions is assistance to the armed forces. The Catholic Church no longer has a
"monopoly over religious assistance." Id.
108 See Martinez-Torr6n, supra note 81, at 355.
109 See Moran, supra note 15, at 545.
110 Paz, supra note 26, at 708.
III Id. Permanent military chaplains of these bodies are not created under these
agreements because "the number of non-Catholic believers in the military would not
justify it," but rather the religious groups are granted "free access" to military estab-
lishments. Martfnez-Torr6n, supra note 81, at 355.
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from each faith."' 12 For instance, the language of the Evangelical
agreement, states that "students, their parents and those school orga-
nisms so requesting, shall be guaranteed the right to receive evangeli-
cal religious classes in public and private subsidised schools."' 13 Also
significant is the "special tax treatment" the state gives to contribu-
tions from the faithful of the various denominations." 4 Each of the
three groups, however, has refused to "accept any financial aid from
their believers' income tax."' 15 Finally, one important difference be-
tween the these agreements and the Catholic agreements should be
noted. In these three agreements, questions of financial aid from the
government are "left to [the] government agencies" that handle spe-
cific matters. I 6
H. Problems in Interpretation and Application
After examining the manner in which the government has filled
in the content of the requirement of cooperation, we should briefly
turn to several problematic issues that have arisen within the religious
liberty context in the years since the ratification of the constitution
and the General Act. These problems illustrate the Spanish religious
liberty regime as a whole and of the possible gaps within this regime.
The first problem, which can serve as an example of the Spanish
approach to religious liberty, arose early in the 1980s when a group of
congressmen challenged the constitutionality of the system of govern-
mental support of Catholic military chaplains.' 17 The congressmen
reasoned that "there is no room in a neutral state for a system of relig-
ious assistance in which ministers of worship are classified as civil ser-
vants.""1 " Though the Spanish Constitutional Court refused to rule
112 Paz, supra note 26, at 708.
113 Art. X, § 1 app. of the Law 24/1992, of 10 November, Approving the Agree-
ment of Cooperation Between the State and the Federation of Evangelical Religious
Entities of Spain (B.O.E., 1992, 272), reprinted in MINISTERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEG-
ISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 81 (Alberto de ]a Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de
Codes eds., 1998).
114 Paz, supra note 26, at 709.
115 See Mordn, supra note 15, at 545-46; see also, Martfnez-Torr6n, supra note 81, at
355.
116 Paz, supra note 26, at 709. Nevertheless, as Paz states, "the government has
extended financial aid to the three faiths in various ways, such as religious education
and pastoral support. These actions have helped overcome the differences between
the minority religions' agreements and those of the Catholic Church." Id.
117 Javier Martinez-Torr6n, Freedom of Religion in the Caselaw of the Spanish Constitu-
tional Court, 2001 BYU L. Riv. 711, 730.
118 Id.
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on the question of constitutionality because of procedural issues,' 1 9
the language of its ruling was nevertheless telling about the Spanish
understanding of religious liberty:
The fact that the State provides Catholic religious assistance to the
members of the Armed Forces not only does not constitute any vio-
lation of the Constitution but, on the contrary, offers the possibility
to render actual the right to worship of individuals and communi-
ties. The right to freedom of religion and worship does not un-
dergo any pressure, for members of the Armed Forces are free to
accept or refuse the assistance they are offered. The right to equal-
ity is not violated either, as the religious service in favor of Catholics
does not exclude religious assistance for the faithful of other reli-
gions, performed in due proportion and measure, which they can
demand. 121)
Notice that the court was saying that "providing Catholic religious
assistance to the military was a way of facilitating the individual sol-
dier's exercise of religious freedom."11 Far from infringing upon the
religious liberty of those in the armed forces, the provision of military
chaplains allowed the freedom of religion actually to mean some-
thing. Though the court did not state that the constitution required
this exact form of cooperation, it nevertheless indicated that the Span-
ish understanding of the demands of freedom of religion was a very
rich one. Under this understanding, state neutrality is not contra-
vened by cooperation and cooperation allows the right of religious
freedom to have a substance it would not otherwise have.
A second issue that presents a thorny problem in the Spanish
context is the question of how one defines religion.1 2 2 Recall that
under the General Act, that "[a]ctivities, purposes and Entities" that
have "non-religious aims" are not protected by the Act. 12-1 At the same
time, registration of religious groups requires a "declaration of relig-
ious purpose." 124 These two principles tie together; one cannot regis-
ter with the government as a religious entity without showing that one
has a religious purpose, as opposed to a non-religious aim. 12 5 A fail-
119 Id.
120 Id. at 731 (quoting STC, May 13, 1982 (S.T.C., No. 24)).
121 Martfnez-Torr6n, supra note 117, at 731 (discussing STC, May 13, 1982 (S.T.C.,
No. 24)) (emphasis added).
122 Martfnez-Torr6n, supra note 81, at 355.
123 General Act, art. Il1, § 2, reprinted in MINiSTERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISt-A-
TION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 42-43 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de
Codes eds., 1998).
124 Id. art. V, § 2, reprinted in MINISTERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLATION ON RE-
LIGIOUS AFFAIRS 43 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes eds., 1998).
125 See Martfnez-Torr6n, supra note 117, at 741 n.97.
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ure to register does not however impair one's right to exercise relig-
ious liberty; this right is still guaranteed under the constitution. 126
This of course raises the question of what the exact "legal concept of
religion" is to be under the Spanish law. 127 Practically, this has
presented hurdles to groups such as the Church of Scientology and
the Church of Unification. 28 The Spanish mode of answering this
question has been quite traditional. According to Professor Martfnez-
Torr6n, the Spanish government has "considered that a certain entity
could be qualified as religious, for legal purposes, when it accommo-
dates to what could be called the functional structure" of either Juda-
ism, Christianity, or Islam. 12 9
Thus, it was fitting that in 2001 a case came before the Constitu-
tional Court on this very question. The Church of Unification was
denied the right to register because the government deemed that it
did not have a religious purpose and because it encouraged "activities
that were contrary to the public order and morals.' ' 3° The court over-
turned the administrative judgment of the Spanish government hold-
ing that the Church of Unification had to be allowed to register.' 3'
According to the Court, "the authorities in charge of the Registry do
not have any discretion . . . to examine the religious nature of any
group that has applied to register."'312 Rather, the authorities "must
limit themselves to confirm[ing]'1 3 3 whether a particular group con-
forms with Article 3, Section 2 of the General Act. 134 This decision is
necessarily conflicted. If the authorities are to have no discretion in
determining whether a group is religious, it seems that they cannot
make a determination on whether a group conforms with the General
Act. At the same time if the authorities are to determine whether a
group conforms, then it seems, by necessity, they must investigate
whether a group is religious. One scholar argues that the Court's rul-
126 See id.
127 Martfnez-Torr6n, supra note 81, at 357.
128 See id.
129 Id. at 348 ("In other words, a group can be considered of religious nature and
aims when it possesses a body of dogmatic and moral tenets derived from the belief in
a supreme being, who is worshipped through some external practices, or rites, and
when it has an organizational structure endowed with certain stability.").
130 Martfnez-Torr6n, supra note 117, at 742 (quoting STC, Feb. 15, 2001 (S.T.C.,
No. 46)).
131 Id. at 743.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See General Act, art. III, § 2, reprinted in MINISTERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISIH LEGIS-
LATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 42-43 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de
Codes eds., 1998).
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ing means that "the Registry will probably have to accept every appli-
cation without further inquiries (except in the unlikely hypothesis
that the applicant group explicitly recognizes, in [its] documents ...
that it is a non-religious organization)."'13 5 This conclusion appears
correct considering that the Court simply allowed the Church of Uni-
fication to be registered, rather than allowing the Registry to make a
determination as to whether the group did in fact have a "non-relig-
ious" purpose. In fact, originally the Registry had stated that the
Church of Unification had a non-religious purpose, which would
seem to have put it within the Court's holding.
Yet another question that arises under the Spanish religious lib-
erty scheme is what constitutes the "notorious influence in Spanish
society"'136 of a religious body required for the state to enter into an
agreement with it. '37 This is not just a theoretical question. Though
they desire to enter into an agreement, the Jehovah Witnesses and the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints have been shut out of
agreements by the government.3: s The government is currently oper-
ating under a policy that no new agreements are necessary. 39 Yet,
these groups have thousands of followers, many more than the Jewish
Communities in Spain.' 41 It seems to one scholar that the Spanish
state only desires to enter into agreements with "the most traditional
religions."' 4' 1 This problem evidences what can occur under a scheme
of cooperation. Necessary decisions and distinctions are made that
leave out some groups and include others.
A final problem that can only be briefly touched upon is the dan-
ger inherent in a system that purposely eschews the idea that the State
should be thoroughly secular and removed from any interactions with
religion or religious bodies. This is the problem of favoring one body
over another. In particular, Spanish law treats the Catholic Church
135 Martinez-Torr6n, supra note 117, at 744.
136 Organic Law, art. 7, § 1, reprinted in MINISTERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLA-
TION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 44 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes
eds., 1998).
137 See Martfnez-Torr6n, supra note 81, at 357; Morn, supra note 15, at 544 (using
the term "radication" instead of influence).
138 See Martinez-Torr6n, supra note 81, at 357.
139 Id.
140 See id. at 357-58. Professor Martinez-Torr6n also stated that, "Numbers are
certainly not the only factor to determine the social rooting of a church, but a neces-
sary element of it, and have an attractive advantage: they can be checked out with
relative objectivity." Id. at 358.
141 Id. at 357.
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differently from other religious bodies. 142 This is not to suggest that
other bodies are treated negatively. But relative to the position of the
Catholic Church, other religious bodies are treated less well. And if
one of the main "constitutional principles" of Spain is "equality"-
namely, that "the State regulation of religious matters must respect
the principle of [the] equality [of religious groups] before the
law"143-then it would seem that Spain is falling short of living up to
this goal. As Professor Moran has stated, "While the unique treatment
of the Catholic Church may be justified by the Church's role in Span-
ish society and culture, this privileged treatment illustrates that equal
treatment of religious confessions, though possibly a goal, is not a re-
ality in Spain."'144
These four problems help to fill out the landscape of the Spanish
system of religious liberty. Others could have been mentioned. 45
Nevertheless, by examining these problems or questions, the advan-
tages and disadvantages, triumphs and failures of the Spanish system
can be more clearly understood and analyzed. Taken as a whole, the
Spanish experience of religious liberty has been one fraught with ten-
sions and successes, innovation and change. Regardless of its overall
success, which incidentally seems to be high, 146 it offers the open ob-
server important insights and contrasts to apply against the American
system-a system to which we turn next.
II. U.S. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY LAW
A. An Introduction
The American experience and its legal framework of religious lib-
erty offer a significant contrast to the Spanish experience and consti-
tutional framework. Though America is a significantly younger
country, it has a longer experience of protecting religion and relig-
ious freedom. As a noted scholar of American religious liberty law,
Michael W. McConnell has written, "religion has a special and unique
142 See, e.g., Mordn, supra note 15, at 542-44 (describing various benefits bestowed
upon the Catholic Church including the promise to "respect Catholic values in public
schools," giving "ecclesiastical court opinions ... civil effect," and ensuring that Cath-
olic religion can be a "main subject in any school").
143 Martfnez-Torr6n, supra note 81, at 346.
144 Mordn, supra note 15, at 542.
145 Freedom of conscience questions come to mind. See, e.g., Martfnez-Torr6n,
supra note 117, at 748.
146 See Martfnez-Torr6n, supra note 81, at 356 (stating that the current religious
liberty scheme is one generally accepted by both Spanish society and the various relig-
ious entities subject to it).
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place in [the American] constitutional order."' 47 Religious liberty has
a special place at the heart of the American constitutional experi-
ment-an experiment that began nearly two hundred years before
the Spanish Constitution enshrined the freedom "of ideology, relig-
ion, and worship" and disavowed any state religion. 14
Before examining the historical and cultural context surrounding
the American notion of religious liberty, it is best to examine the core
constitutional text that protects religious liberty in America. The Con-
stitution's protection of religion is found in the First Amendment,
which reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ' 149 Those sixteen
simple words are the ground upon which the American religious lib-
erty doctrines rest.' 50 And though the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause "form a single grammatical unit and reflect a
common history," the two clauses have not been "interpreted
complentarily.11 5'
B. The Historical Framework In Which and From Which
the First Amendment Arose
To understand better the meaning and nature of the First
Amendment, it is important to briefly examine the historical milieu in
which those sixteen simple words were framed. Here, two specific
questions come to mind: what was the historical impetus behind en-
shrining religious liberty in the Constitution? What was the meaning
of the religion clause or clauses?
Professor John Witte, one of the leading scholars on American
religious liberty law, has described the First Amendment as "ex-
147 Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
1, 15 (2000).
148 C.E. art 16, § 1 (Spain), reprinted in MINISrERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLA-
TION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 28 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes
eds., 1998).
149 U.S. CoNs;r. amend. I.
150 The Constitution also forbids making political office subject to a religious test
or oath. Id. art. VI, cl. 3. But this provision has never been one of the prime founda-
tions of constitutional adjudication of religious liberty. SeeJohn Witte,Jr. & M. Chris-
tian Green, The American Constitutional Experiment in Religious Human Rights: The
Perennial Search for Principles, in RELIG;OUS HUMAN RiGHTS IN GLOBAt. PERSPECTIVrE: LE-
GAL PERSPECriVES 498 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996).
151 Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 695 (1992).
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press[ing] both theological and political sentiments."' 52 In his view,
the religion clauses, "reflect both the convictions of the religious be-
lievers of the young American republic and the calculations of their
political leaders."15 3 What were the convictions and principles of the
religious and political leaders who framed the First Amendment?
According to Professor McConnell, there were four basic ap-
proaches to the relationship between the state and religion in the
American colonies. 54 The first model was a Puritan or Congregation-
alist model that predominated in the New England States. 155 There,
"[b]oth civil and church governance were established in accordance
with their 'congregational' understanding of church polity."'1 56 The
Puritans had come to the new world "to establish a Christian common-
wealth where . . .society would be directed by the revealed word of
God. ' 157 It is important to note that the church and state were not
intertwined to such a degree as to be indistinguishable. Rather, the
church and state were two separate but cooperating institutions of
"Godly authority"1 58 working towards the same goal. 15 9 Nevertheless,
the Puritans' vision of the state as religiously motivated and ordained
for God left no room for toleration. In the Puritan view, there was
one path to God, and freedom to pursue other paths was simply
impermissible.
A second, very different, model of relations between the state and
religion was to be found in Virginia, where the Anglican Church was
"established by order of the Crown" in order to control society. 160
There the church was controlled by the government. 161 At the same
time, religious dissent was not tolerated. 162 The contrast between the
Virginian and Puritan models has been aptly described by Professor
McConnell: "[t]he New England establishments arose from a grass-
roots movement born of the conviction that religious truth should
152 JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT:
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 23 (2000); see also Witte & Green, supra note 150, at
501.
153 WITTE, supra note 152, at 23.
154 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1421 (1990).
155 Id. at 1422.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 505.
159 See id. at 504-05.
160 McConnell, supra note 154, at 1423.
161 Id.
162 Id.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
control all of society, while the Virginia establishment was imposed
from above and dedicated to governmental control over religion."'163
In some of the original American colonies, a third model of "be-
nign neglect" dominated. 164 Colonies such as New York and New
Jersey, tolerated religious dissent and diversity, in part, because of the
wide array of religious believers who lived in these colonies.165
The final model of religious toleration that appeared in the
American colonies was that of safe-haven. This existed where colonies
"were established explicitly as havens for religious dissenters.' 1 66 Five
colonies were formed in this manner and each of them embraced a
policy of religious toleration.' 67 These four models necessarily in-
formed the debate surrounding religious liberty in the English colo-
nies, which soon were to become a nation.
Additional ideas made up the historical context. Professor Witte
and Professor M. Christian Green describe two "theological perspec-
tives" and two "political perspectives" that informed the American
scene in the 18th century: these are the Puritan and Evangelical free-
church religious views and the Enlightenment and Republican politi-
cal philosophies. 168 The Puritan view, as described above, saw the
church and the state as separate institutions, though both were or-
dained by God.1' Certain basic "safeguards" existed to "ensure the
... separation of the institutions of church and state."'170 Though a
certain level of separateness existed between the two institutions, they
still were complementary in function. The state supported the church
(even materially), and the church supported the state. 171 And of
course, even in the midst of this separation, the Puritan view "left little
room for individual religious experimentation."'' 72
163 Id.
164 Id. at 1424.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 See id. at 1424-25 (describing the founding of Carolina, Delaware, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island as such havens). It should be noted that Maryland,
which was founded as a Catholic haven, found itself controlled after 1689 by its Prot-
estant majority, who made the Anglican Church the official religion and embraced a
policy of religious intolerance. Id. at 1424.
168 Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 502-03.
169 See id. at 504-05 (describing how the Puritans saw "the church and the state as
two separate covenantal associations, two seats of Godly authority").
170 Id. at 504.
171 See id. at 505. (describing the aid given to the churches by state officials and
the reciprocal material aid provided to the state by the churches).
172 Id. at 506.
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Evangelical views, which emerged after the above four models
were in place, 173 were, on the other hand, much more tolerant.
Evangelicals "advanced a theological theory of religious rights and lib-
erties," holding that there was a right to liberty of conscience and a
right to freedom of association. 174 They advocated prohibitions on
any sort of religious establishment. 175 One preacher of the school
even stated that "'IIt]he notion of a Christian commonwealth should
be exploded forever."I76 Witte and Green suggest that a theology of
"[r] eligious voluntarism lay at the heart" of this thinking, under which
every person "must be given the liberty of conscience to choose to
change his or her faith." 177
Enlightenment thinking also played a part in the development of
religious liberty in America. Motivating the American Enlightenment
thinkers was a desire to "free politics and the state from the influence
of religion and the church."178 These thinkers wanted to end relig-
ion's often coercive effect upon the political regime. Whereas the
Evangelicals were motivated partly out of their experience of persecu-
tion to call for a disentanglement of religion from the state, the En-
lightenment view arose out of a severe distrust of religion and a belief
that its alignment with the state led to deleterious effects. 179 At the
same time, Enlightenment thinkers believed that the state could not
force a person to decide the "duty" he might have to the "Creator"
and the exact way in which that duty should manifest itself.'80
Finally, a Civic Republicanism captured the minds of many dur-
ing this period of American history. This group favored religious lib-
erty but at the same time wanted to "cultivate" a larger "set of
common values and beliefs for the new nation."'' By its very nature,
173 See id. at 506-08 (describing how Evangelical views did not arise as a strong
force until the middle part of the eighteenth century).
174 Id. at 507.
175 See id. (stating that the Evangelicals "agita[ted] for a fuller separation of the
institutions of church and state" than the Puritans).
176 Id. (quoting John Leland, a Baptist preacher).
177 Id. Part of the motivation of the Evangelicals was their own experience of per-
secution. See id. at 508. (detailing the religious persecution suffered by the
Evangelicals).
178 Id. at 509. Among these thinkers were Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.
See id. at 509-10.
179 See id. at 509 ("Such views were based on a profound skepticism about organ-
ized religion and a profound fear of an autocratic state.").
180 Id. at 509-10.
181 Id. at 511. Professors Witte and Green state that the "principal spokesmen" of
this group includedJohn Adams, George Washington, Samuel Adams, andJames Wil-
son. Id.
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this set of ideas saw a place for state support of religion. 182 Because
common civic values and beliefs were to underpin the nation, the
state had a proper role in supporting those institutions that incul-
cated such common values and beliefs in the populace.
Professor Witte argues that these theological and philosophical
views coalesced around a common understanding of basic principles
of religious liberty. 183 These basic principles of religious liberty were:
"liberty of conscience, free exercise of religion, religious pluralism,
religious equality, separation of church and state, and disestablish-
ment of religion."'184 A brief description of each is in order. The free-
dom of conscience was the right of each individual "to worship God"
as he saw fit free from coercion, as well as the freedom from being
discriminated against because of his religious beliefs.' 85 The free ex-
ercise of religion "was the right to act publicly on the choices of con-
science once made, without intruding on or obstructing the rights of
others or the general peace of the community."' 18 6 Religious plural-
ism consisted of a diversity of religious groups and diversity of relig-
ious associations; 87 free exercise protected churches and synagogues
as well as "[f]amilies, schools, charities, and other learned and civic
societies [which] were equally vital bastions of religion."1 8 Religious
equality was the simple principle that religious groups should be
182 See id. at 512.
183 See WITrE, supra note 152, at 57.
184 Id.
185 See id. at 40. It is important to note that some commentators have argued that
in the use of the words "free exercise of religion," religion should not be taken as
synonymous with conscience. That is, within the American context, freedom of relig-
ion does not mean freedom of conscience. As Professor McConnell has stated, "The
Framers .. .seriously considered enacting a constitutional protection for 'con-
science,' presumably a broader term, and deliberately adopted the term 'religion'
instead." McConnell, supra note 147, at 12. Another commentator writes that the
Free Exercise Clause "is, by its terms, about prohibiting the free exercise of religion
rather than of unbelief. It follows that [it] is not an all-purpose conscience clause."
Carl H. Esbeck, The American System of Church-State Relations and Its Bearing on Church
Autonomy, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 149, 156-57 (Gerhard Rob-
bers ed., 2001). Rather than protecting all activity motivated by conscience, the
clause "protects religiously informed belief and practice." Id. at 158. Perhaps these
comments can be reconciled with those of Professor Witte by understanding freedom
of conscience as Witte uses it not in terms of freedom to act upon every conclusion to
which conscience arrives but rather as freedom of conscience in religious matters.
Witte might even agree. See Wrrr"E, supra note 152, at 86 (noting that the "Founders
often used the term 'free exercise' synonymously with liberty of conscience" to indi-
cate a more limited view of conscience than the one that now prevails).
186 WIrrE, supra note 152, at 42-43.
187 See id. at 44-45.
188 Id. at 45.
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treated equally "before the law."' 18 9 The early Americans also held a
similar understanding of the separation of church and state. This
value understood the church and state to have different natures, and
to be distinct institutions, and therefore that their "offices and of-
ficers" must be kept separate and distinct.19 1 It is important to note
that this did not mean that religion had nothing to say to the political
realm. Rather, it meant that the political realm could not be the con-
fused with the religious. Finally, a common principle of the founding
era was the disestablishment of religion. This encompassed a belief
that the state should no longer prescribe the religious tenets and prac-
tices of a political community. 19'
These models of church and state, these theological and philo-
sophical views and these principles of religious liberty were the com-
mon heritage that necessarily influenced the drafting and ratification
of the First Amendment. As Professors Witte and Green write, "It is in
the context of this plurality of opinions and panoply of principles that
the First Amendment religion clauses must be understood."'19 2 In
their opinion, the First Amendment-especially after it became incor-
porated against the states-must itself be read as incorporating the
various principles and ideas that were part of the political milieu at
the time of the First Amendment's ratification. 19 3 Thus, the final
words which became the First Amendment, 9 4 after some debate,19 5
must be understood not narrowly but broadly as integrating the vari-
ous motivating principles discussed above. This of course makes
marking off the boundaries of American religious freedom law an ex-
tremely difficult task. In fact, "[d] etermining the original understand-
ing of the First Amendment has been the perennial challenge of the
American experiment ever since" the ratification of that amendment
some 200 years ago. 196 Let us then turn to the manner in which the
American republic has undertaken this challenge in the years since
the First Amendment was framed. And though legislatures are in-
creasingly taking up their forgotten mantle in the arena of religious
189 Id. at 45-46.
190 Id. at 48-49.
191 Id. at 51. It does not appear that there existed clarity on whether disestablish-
ment prohibited all state support of religion. In fact there seemed to be a split of
opinion, some believing all such support to be barred and others seeing such support
as "necessary for good governance." Id. at 53-54.
192 Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 530.
193 See id. at 531.
194 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
195 For explanation of this debate, see WrTrE, supra note 152, at 63-72.
196 Id. at 72.
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liberty, 197 the focus of our investigation will be the Supreme Court,
which has been the prime "laboratory . . . [of] the American experi-
ment" in recent years.'9 8
C. Supreme Court Religious Liberty Jurisprudence Before 1940
Throughout much of the life of the American republic, the Su-
preme Court "had little occasion to interpret and apply the First
Amendment religion clauses."'199 The rationale behind this was that it
was generally "understood that state constitutions ... governed most
religious and ecclesiastical affairs." 200 In most of the handful of cases
addressed by the Supreme Court in these first 150 years of the repub-
lic, the Court said little of import about religious liberty. However, in
a few cases the Court was, according to Professors Witte and Green,
"more forthcoming" about religious liberty.201 Among the issues de-
cided by the Court was whether the federal government could mone-
tarily support the building of a Catholic hospital202 and whether it
could support the operation of a "Catholic mission school among the
native American Indians."20 3 In both instances, the Court endorsed
the governmental action. At the same time, "the Court insisted that
religious bodies may resolve their property disputes among themselves
, may hold monastic properties in community despite counter-
vailing private property rules, [and] may appoint clergy from abroad
without Congressional interference. 211 4 Outside of these few in-
stances however, the Court had little occasion to fill in the contours of
the religious liberty landscape. This, of course, was in part because
states regulated religion and because the Court had yet to incorporate
the First Amendment against the states. All this changed in the 1940s
with the cases of Cantwell v. Connecticut20 5 and Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation,206 which incorporated the Free Exercise and Establishment
197 See Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 500 (stating that "state legislatures have
become bolder in conducting their own experiments in religious liberty").
198 Id. at 499.
199 Id. at 533.
200 Id. In fact only twenty-three cases involving "religious questions . . . came to
the United States Supreme Court... between 1789 and 1940." id. at 534.
201 Id.
202 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
203 Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 534 (describing Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210
U.S. 50 (1908)).
204 Id.
205 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
206 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Clauses, respectively, against the states.2' 1 7 These cases ushered in a
new era of religious liberty law. To this era, we now turn.
D. Modern Relifgious Liberty Law
Now that we have scrutinized the historical context of American
religious liberty law and the Court's handling of religious liberty issues
in the first 150 years after the Constitution's ratification, we can turn
to the modern interpretation of the First Amendment. Because the
Supreme Court has chosen to interpret the religion clause not as one
single whole, but rather as two separate clauses, this section will con-
sider religious liberty law under both the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment headings. Lest one think that the historical exercise has been
for naught, an important point must be emphasized. Precisely be-
cause the Constitution is so vague as to what constitutes establishment
and what is an infringement of free exercise, the Supreme Court has
had to "'draw lines' to define the scope of protection" of the religion
clauses. 21 1 8 In order to draw such lines, the Court has "in part . . .
rel[ied] on historical documents that tend to reveal the framers' in-
tent in enacting the First Amendment. 2119 The Court's foray into the
religious liberty arena has necessitated returning to the sources of the
amendment-returning, if you will, to the political and religious mi-
lieu of early America and looking to the principles that inspired and
informed the crafting of the new constitutional order.
Also, to better frame the analysis of each clause of the First
Amendment separately, one must keep in mind that "[t] he free exer-
cise principle 'singles out' religion for special protection against gov-
ernmental hostility or interference," while the "disestablishment
principle prevents the government from using its power to promote,
advocate, or endorse any particular religious position."210 Because
the modern Court first addressed the free exercise question, we will
begin there and proceed to the modern American understanding of
the Establishment Clause.
1. Free Exercise
The Free Exercise Clause reads, "Congress shall make no law...
prohibiting the free exercise" of religion.2 1 ' At its most basic, this
207 See Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 535.
208 Inke Muehlhoft, Freedom of Religion in Public Schools in Germany and in the United
States, 28 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 405, 410 (2000).
209 Id.
210 McConnell, supra note 147, at 43.
211 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
clause "protects religiously informed belief and practice."212 This is
not to say that the government is free to run roughshod over the be-
liefs of the non-religious. That is, the government cannot force its
citizens to take a particular religious view or engage in specific relig-
ious practices. This is something protected not by the Free Exercise
Clause but by the Establishment Clause.213
Modern free exercise law began with the Cantwel1214 case. There,
the right to freely exercise one's religion was given broad meaning. 215
Professors Witte and Green have written that "the Court read the free
exercise clause in capacious terms-as a protection for the beliefs of
conscience and religious actions of all religious faiths, up to the famil-
iar limits of public peace and order, and countervailing constitutional
rights."21 In subsequent years, the Court began to apply this broad
reading of the clause, holding, among other things, that the state
could not require a student to pledge allegiance to the flag,2 17 and
striking "down several permit, licensing, and taxing ordinances that
targeted, and burdened, the core proselytizing activities of Jehovah's
Witnesses."218 One of the themes running through these cases was
that religions should be treated equally and without discrimination. 2 1
No formal test, however, was established until Sherbert v. Verner 220
Professors Witte and Green aptly describe this test:
Henceforth, any governmental policy or law that was challenged
under the free exercise clause had to meet four criteria to pass con-
stitutional muster. The policy or law must: (1) serve a compelling
state interest; (2) be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest with
the least possible intrusion on free exercise rights; (3) be non-dis-
criminatory against religion on its face; and (4) be non-discrimina-
tory against religion in application. Governmental policies that met
all four criteria could be enforced, even though they had an adverse
impact on religion. Policies that did not meet such criteria were
212 Esbeck, supra note 185, at 158.
213 See id. at 158-59.
214 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
215 See id. at 309-11 (reversing ajudgment affirming defendants' convictions for
unauthorized soliciting and breach of the peace for playing a recording of statements
attacking organized religions as part of a door-to-door campaign).
216 Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 536.
217 Id. at 537 (discussing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943)).
218 Id. (citing seven Supreme Court cases from the years 1943 to 1946).
219 Id. at 538.
220 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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either to be struck down, or applied in a manner that minimized, or
eliminated, their affront to religion. 22 1
The Court was striking a balance between the legitimate interests
a state has in regulating conduct and the very real and important right
to exercise one's deepest religious beliefs.22 2 This appeared to com-
port with the fundamental principles that informed the drafting of
the Constitution and the First Amendment. The Framers did not un-
derstand free exercise to be absolute; one could not act upon one's
beliefs no matter what the consequence or potential infringement on
others.223 And the Sherbert test protected equality and non-discrimina-
tion interests that had informed the Framers as well. It is also impor-
tant to point out that, though the government had a difficult burden
to meet these four criteria, it nevertheless prevailed in most of the free
exercise cases brought after the test was put into place.
2 24
The scheme put into place under Sherbert would not last forever.
Some twenty-seven years later, in Employment Division v. Smith,225 the
Court would reconsider its test and offer a new one which, at least
facially, seemed to give religious exercise much less protection. In
short, Smith "signaled a sharp break from the Court's earlier willing-
ness to consider religious exemptions from generally applicable
laws."'22 6 Repudiating its former doctrine, the Court stated that the
"right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his relig-
ion prescribes (or proscribes).' "227 Practically, this meant that if a
"law is 'generally applicable', [sic] the government need not show that
it serves an important (let alone compelling) purpose, even if its effect
• ..is to make the practice of a religion virtually impossible. '228 The
new Smith doctrine deconstitutionalized religious exemptions; no
221 Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 539; see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-07.
222 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (considering whether "some compelling state interest
enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina Statute justifies the sub-
stantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right").
223 See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
224 See Muehlhoff, supra note 208, at 434 (citing JOHN E. NowAuK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw § 17.6 (5th ed. 1995)). This is not to say that the test
was without effect. Professors Witte and Green argue that the test "rendered the free
exercise clause a formidable obstacle to both subtle and overt forms of religious
prejudice and insensitivity against religious individuals." Witte & Green, supra note
150, at 540.
225 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
226 Muehlhoff, supra note 208, at 435.
227 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
228 McConnell, supra note 7, at 68.
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longer would the Constitution be seen as exempting those with a re-
ligiously grounded objection to a law or governmental regulation
from that law or regulation.
After Smith, the law can be distilled to three main principles. The
first of these can be stated simply: it is unconstitutional for the govern-
ment to use its "regulatory power ... to discriminate against religious
exercise." 229 The second principle is that "neutral and generally ap-
plicable" regulation is generally permitted.23 1 Nothing in Smith for-
bade state legislative bodies from exempting individuals from a law or
regulation for a religious reason. In fact, Justice Scalia wrote in Smith
that "to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitu-
tionally required."23 The Court's argument was not that such exemp-
tions were forbidden but, rather, that such exemptions were not
constitutionally required. Therefore, a third principle is discernable.
At the "discretion of the legislature, religious exercise may be ex-
empted from neutral and generally applicable laws." 232 This third
principle is subject to the further caveats that such an "accommoda-
tion" must be "'designed to alleviate government intrusions that
might significantly deter adherents of a particular faith from conduct
protected by the Free Exercise Clause,' and [that it] would not 'have
the effect of "inducing" religious belief.' "233
At the same time, a further gloss must be put on Smith. Though
many argued that Smith sounded the death knell for free exercise, 23 4
others have been more hopeful about the decision.23 5 In fact, it
seems that Smith leaves open a pretty expansive set of exceptions to its
general rule. The general rule of Smith that "the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid
229 McConnell, supra note 147, at 41 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)).
230 Id. (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 890).
231 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
232 McConnell, supra note 147, at 41.
233 Id. (citations omitted).
234 Smith, supra note 7, at 232 (arguing that "Smith reaches a low point in modern
constitutional protection under the Free Exercise Clause").
235 Professor Richard Duncan states that "[a]ccording to the conventional wisdom
in the community of First Amendment scholars, in [Smith] the Supreme Court 'aban-
doned' its longstanding commitment to protecting the free exercise of religion and
'created a legal framework for persecution' of religious dissenters." Richard F.
Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi, and the General
Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 850, 850 (2001). Duncan, however, be-
lieves that "[t]he Free Exercise Clause is the Mark Twain of Constitutional Law, be-
cause the recent report of its death 'was an exaggeration."' Id.
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and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes)" is subject to a strong exception.2 36 A law which burdens
free exercise cannot be underinclusive in pursuing its purpose. 237
Such a law "is underinclusive, with respect to any particular govern-
ment interest, if the law fails to pursue that interest uniformly against
other conduct that causes similar damage to that government inter-
est."238 To determine if such underinclusiveness exists, the analysis
employed must raise two important questions:
First, what governmental purposes are being served by the restric-
tive law at issue? Second, does the law exempt or otherwise leave
unrestricted secular conduct that endangers those governmental
purposes in a similar or greater degree than the prohibited or re-
stricted conduct of the party seeking the protection of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause?239
With these additional qualifications, Smith seems less burden-
some, or at least potentially less burdensome than initially thought.
Nevertheless, Smith signaled a departure from previous case law and
possibly a departure from the constitutional roots of free exercise. 240
At the same time, Smith cannot be seen as the monolithic repre-
sentative of America's current understanding of religious liberty. In
fact, as evidenced by congressional action shortly after the Smith deci-
sion, there is a significant gap between the Court's understanding of
religious liberty and a large portion of the political community. In
1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) ,241 which "was specifically designed to repudiate the Smith ap-
proach to free exercise analysis, and to restore the 'compelling state
interest' test."242 RFRA stated:
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a per-
son's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section.
236 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
237 See Duncan, supra note 235, at 868.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 This is especially true considering that the founding generation considered
religious free exercise a prerogative only to be limited by the safety and peace of the
state and other constitutional protections. See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying
text.
241 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (2000)).
242 Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 546.
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(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
24 3
As one commentator wrote, RFRA "was a bold attempt to restore
a stricter standard of review for free exercise cases" 244 and to reinvigo-
rate American protection of freedom of religion. Criticism and praise
for RFRA abounded,245 and it was not long before the act found itself
before the Supreme Court. In City of Boerne v. Flores,246 the Court held
that RFRA was "unconstitutional, at least as applied to the states. '247
Because RFRA "fundamentally changed the free exercise law,"'2 48 Con-
gress's argument that it was simply employing its powers of enforce-
ment under the Fourteenth Amendment failed.249 The Smith test was
restored for "free exercise claims against state and local laws."'250 Nev-
ertheless, RFRA was an indication that a tension existed between the
popular political understanding of the First Amendment and the con-
stitutional doctrine laid down in Smith. This meant that Smith was not
only a significant departure from the historical underpinnings of the
First Amendment, it was a departure from current American under-
standing and the values of the American citizenry.
In the wake of Smith and Boerne, it is appropriate to ask whether
the four different strands of influence that existed at the time of the
framing and the various values concerning religious liberty of the
founding generation are still equally present. 251 It is not entirely clear
that they are. The different understandings that were present at the
243 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
244 WrrrIE, supra note 152, at 124.
245 See, e.g., id. at 124-25; Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 547 ("Some defend it
as the only sensible constitutional remedy to end the contemporary 'crisis of religious
liberty,' and ... [o]thers denounce the statute as a violation of the principle of sepa-
ration of powers.").
246 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
247 Wrrr, supra note 152, at 124.
248 Id. at 125; see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (stating that Congress was
attempting through RFRA to make "substantive alteration" to the Smith holding).
249 See WiTTE, supra note 152, at 124-25; see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-36
(dismissing the claim that Congress was simply using its powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
250 WITTE, supra note 152, at 125. In the realm of federal laws, RFRA remains
good law and has subsequently been applied. Id.
251 See supra notes 154-91 and accompanying text.
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founding of America have become unwoven. Now it can be argued
that the Enlightenment model that saw the state as needing to be free
of religion has gained a dominant position.252 In particular, Civic Re-
publicanism, 25 3 which saw an important public place for religion, does
not seem to have as influential a role in the American legal discourse
on religious liberty.
2. Establishment
Modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence has its foundations
in the Everson254 case, where at issue was a provision by a school board
to reimburse parents for the transportation costs to send their chil-
dren to school. The school board made payments to parents who sent
their children to Catholic schools.2 55 Though the Court upheld these
payments, it was the language it employed in doing so that was signifi-
cant. The Court wrote,
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force
nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion.... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice relig-
ion.... [T] he clause.., was intended to erect "a wall of separation
between church and State." 256
Later the Court stated that the "First Amendment has erected a
wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and im-
pregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. '257 Neverthe-
less, the Court found no breach of the wall of separation. Because of
this, commentators found the decision contradictory and
confusing. 258
252 See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
253 See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
254 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
255 Id. at 3.
256 Id. at 15-16.
257 Id. at 18.
258 See McConnell, supra note 7, at 70-71 ('justice Black's opinion for the Court
was uncharacteristically indecisive; it resembled one of those comedy routines in
which the good angel whispers in the character's right ear and the naughty devil in
the left.").
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The principles laid out in Everson were applied in a host of cases
in the following years. Most of these cases dealt with establishment
questions in public schools. 259 In one case, Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Education,260 the Court struck down a provision allowing stu-
dents time during the school day to take religious education classes
offered onsite at the public school. 261 The Court premised its deci-
sion on an understanding of the First Amendment in which "both re-
ligion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if
each is left free from the other within its respective sphere. 262
Because Everson had not formulated a clear rule as to what consti-
tuted a violation of the Establishment Clause, the Court finally made
such a formulation in Lemon v. Kurtzman.263 As Professors Witte and
Green describe it, to conform with the requirements of the Establish-
ment Clause, a governmental law or policy would need "a secular,
non-religious purpose," while having "a predominantly secular, or
non-religious effect," and at the same time, not foster an "excessive
entanglement between church and state."2 6 4 In the wake of the Lemon
test, "many traditional forms and forums of collaboration between
church and state in delivering education" were rendered unconstitu-
tional.265 In one of the most striking examples, "[t]he Court disal-
259 See Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 548 n.223.
260 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
261 Id. at 209-10; see also Muehlhoff, supra note 208, at 414.
262 McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212. Amazingly, four years later the Court upheld a
similar "time release" program where the students took their instruction offsite. See
Muehlhoff, supra note 208, at 414-15 (discussing Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306
(1952)).
263 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
264 Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 549. The Supreme Court in Lemon stated,
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative
criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion[ ]; finally, the statute must not foster "an
excessive government entanglement with religion."
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted).
265 Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 549. It is important to note what this does
not mean. Professor Esbeck wrote,
[T]he Establishment Clause is not violated when a governmental restriction
(or social welfare program) merely reflects a moral judgment, shared by
some religions, about conduct thought harmful (or beneficial) to society.
Accordingly, overlap between a law's purpose and the moral teachings of a
variety of well-known religions does not, without more, render the law one
concerning "an establishment of religion."
Esbeck, supra note 185, at 165-66.
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lowed states from loaning or furnishing religious schools with
textbooks, various supplies and films, and various counselling and
other personnel, all of which were made mandatory by state policy.
266
The departure of the Court from at least the tacit understanding
of religious liberty and the practices of the founding generation was
remarkable. The Court seems to have pushed the principles of dises-
tablishment and separation of church and state further than they had
existed during the founding, and out of balance with other values that
they intended to protect. Perhaps, in part, this led the Court to begin
to depart from the Lemon test in recent years. The Court "held that
the Lemon test was not violated when Congress afforded church-affili-
ated counseling centers .. . funding" for a federal program,2 67 or
when a law allowed "students equal access ... to school facilities" for
religiously-based "activities after school hours. ' 268 This departure was
seen most readily in Mitchell v. Helms269 and Zelman v. Simmons-Har-
ris.270 Writing for a plurality of the Court in Mitchell, Justice Thomas
upheld a program that lent "educational materials and equipment to
public and private schools," including religious schools. 27 1 He stated
that
if the government, seeking to further some legitimate secular pur-
pose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all
who adequately further that purpose... then it is fair to say that any
aid going to a religious recipient only has the effect of furthering
that secular purpose.272
Though the government was no longer barred from giving aid such as
textbooks to religious schools, the Court still emphasized the princi-
ples of neutrality and secularity. In Zelman, the Court placed much
emphasis on the fact that the program in question directed money
toward religious schools only through private choice. The Court
stated,
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to relig-
ion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who,
in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result
of their own genuine and independent private choice, the program
is not readily subject to a challenge under the Establishment Clause.
266 Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 550 (describing Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975)).
267 Id. at 552 (describing Bowers v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988)).
268 Id. (describing Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)).
269 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
270 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
271 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801 (plurality opinion).
272 Id. at 810 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
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A program that shares these features permits government aid to
reach religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of
numerous individual recipients. The incidental advancement of a
religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious mes-
sage, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the
government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits. 273
The Court concluded that the Cleveland program-the program
at issue-was an example of "true private choice." 274 The emphasis
on private choice and the Court's focus on the detachment of the
government from direct subsidization of education at religious
schools is striking.
Even in light of these recent developments and this minor rap-
prochement of the tradition, the Court is still arguably far from many
of the animating ideas of the First Amendment. And, at the same
time, a new rule has not been explicated and the Lemon test has not
been overruled, leading to a situation in the law of the Establishment
Clause that two commentators have called "a state of confusion." 275
III. SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES:
A CONVERSATION WITH A CONCLUSION
In the preceding two Parts, I gave a broad overview of the Spanish
and American approaches to religious liberty. It is apparent from
reading these sections that the systems are significantly different in
the manner in which they protect and promote the basic human right
of religious liberty.27 6 They attempt to actualize this right in very dif-
ferent manners. These differences are apparent in each system's un-
derstanding of free exercise, each country's understanding of
establishment, the connection between free exercise and establish-
273 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
274 Id.
275 Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 553. According to Professors Witte and
Green,
The Court has transmuted the Lemon test into at least four principles, which
the Court is now seeking to integrate. Justice Souter has urged the principle
of governmental neutrality toward religion. Justice O'Connor would strike
down policies that reflect governmental endorsement or condemnation of
religion. Justice Kennedy would strike only governmental action that co-
erces or compels an individual or group to accept or adopt religion. justice
Scalia and [Justice] Thomas would accord great weight to historical practices
and legislative preferences. Though each of these new principles has cap-
tured a majority of the Court in an individual case, none of them has as yet
come to dominate establishment clause jurisprudence.
Id.
276 On this basic human right, see infra Part lII.A.
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ment in each context, and finally, in the overall story told by each
country's system of religious liberty.
A. The Basic Human Right of Religious Liberty
Before bringing the Spanish and American legal approaches into
conversation, it is beneficial to discuss briefly the very freedom which
religious liberty law seeks to protect. As noted above, religious free-
dom in Spain was recognized in part because of developments in the
teaching of the Catholic Church concerning religious liberty.277 This
development was seen most significantly in Dignitatis Humanae,278 the
Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom. Be-
cause this document served as an impetus for Spanish reform, and
because it lays out a vivid and rich vision of what religious liberty is
and why it exists, I will briefly discuss it here. Dignitatis Humanae un-
equivocally states "that the human person has a right to religious free-
dom."279 This freedom is something that flows from the dignity of the
person: "the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very
dignity of the human person."2 10
Because of their nature, men and women are "impelled ... and
also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious
truth."28' To live out their nature and fulfill their obligation, there-
fore, it is necessary that men and women be free from limits and "ex-
ternal coercion." 28 2 Thus, governments are obligated to give their
citizens a zone of freedom in which the religious quest can be lived
out by each person. This freedom should not be a merely individual
or personal freedom. Because of the human person's "social na-
ture,"283 the right to religious freedom is "to be recognized ... when
[individuals] act in community" as well. 28 4 This is a recognition of
the necessary social implication of religion. The religious impulse
makes itself felt not only in the recesses of the conscience but also in
the social and cultural life of a nation.
Attached to an understanding of the individual and social aspects
of religion, is a set of positive obligations placed upon the state to
promote religion. The document envisages a freedom of religion that
not only places negative limits upon the power of government over
277 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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religious matters, 2 5 but also places affirmative, positive duties upon
government to build up the religious life of the state. In paragraph
six, the document states,
Government is also to help create conditions favorable to the foster-
ing of religious life, in order that the people may be truly enabled to
exercise their religious rights and to fulfill their religious duties,
and also in order that society itself may profit by the moral qualities
of justice and peace .... 286
This is a vision which holds religion to be a good in and of itself,
and one that sees that in order to be fully lived, religious freedom
necessitates positive shpport on the part of the government. Finally,
the right to religious freedom is not an absolute right. Because the
right is exercised within society, it is "subject to certain regulatory
norms," most notably "the moral principle of personal and social
responsibility." 287
Below, as I bring the Spanish and American systems into conver-
sation, it is the vision of religious freedom of Dignitatis Humanae that I
have in mind as I discuss the strengths and failings of the respective
systems. Most important to note is the document's understanding of
religious freedom having both an individual and social quality.
B. Understandings of Free Exercise
As we saw above, the American approach to free exercise-at
least in its most recent incarnation-appears to allow severe curtail-
ments of religious free exercise. One can imagine a prohibition upon
the sale of any form of alcohol which is applicable to all and does not
contain any statutory exemptions for religious groups to purchase
wine for religious purposes. 28  Imagine further, that the law allows no
exceptions for any other group. The law is motivated by a desire to
end abhorrent debauchery associated with drinking; no religious ani-
mus animates the law. The law is perfectly constitutional under Smith
even though it would severely affect those who believe that their relig-
ious rites require wine. The American approach would allow some-
one to believe that his religion requires him to use wine during its
rites but not allow him actually to exercise his beliefs. That, of course,
does not mean that any law which deleteriously affects religion is al-
285 See id. 6 (stating that "government is to assume the safeguard of the religious
freedom of all its citizens ... by just laws and by other appropriate means").
286 Id.
287 Id. 7.
288 I thought of this hypothetical after reading an article mentioning Prohibition's
exemption for sacramental wine. See McConnell, supra note 151, at 706.
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lowed nor that laws such as this would actually come into being. Nev-
ertheless, this example illustrates the thin vision of free exercise that
the Supreme Court has recently proposed. 2 9 Before contrasting this
with the Spanish model, it should be remembered that such a concep-
tion of free exercise did not seem to animate the drafters of the Free
Exercise Clause. For them, free exercise meant the ability to act out
one's religious beliefs so long as the public peace and the rights of
others were not disturbed.290 Behind the phrase "prohibiting the free
exercise" of religion was the idea that religious exercise could not be
limited but for extreme circumstances where the public peace and/or
the rights of others were intruded upon. The Court has, arguably,
now turned this idea on its head and held that a governmental burden
on religion is only unlawful where the burden was specifically placed
on the religion and not on other groups.
On the other hand, the Spanish conception of free exercise is
thicker, more comprehensive, and ultimately deeper. This is evident
both from the specific language used in the Spanish constitution,
where the exercise of religion can only be limited when it "may be
necessary to maintain public order"291 and the early decision of the
Spanish Constitutional Court affirming the use of military chap-
lains.2 92 Recall that in that decision the court stated that the govern-
ment's provision of Catholic chaplains was not only constitutional, but
actually was the avenue by which free exercise became meaningful. 2
9 3
Though the court did not state that the government had to give such
aid, its language came fairly close to making this a requirement.294 All
the same, the court's language underlined a sharp difference in Span-
ish discourse about free exercise. The right to freely exercise one's
religion in Spain not only means that the government must refrain
from certain actions-namely, those that infringe upon that right-
but that the government has a positive duty to help foster the free
289 Of course, legislative enactments can make this understanding of free exercise
much thicker. Any law which has the potential to burden religion could simply be
written with religious exemptions.
290 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
291 C.E. art. 16, §§ 1-3 (Spain).
292 STC, May 13, 1982 (S.T.C., No. 24).
293 See Martinez-Torr6n, supra note 117, at 731 (quoting STC, May 13, 1982
(S.T.C., No. 24) ("The fact that the State provides Catholic religious assistance to the
members of the Armed Forces not only does not constitute any violation of the Con-
stitution but, on the contrary, offers the possibility to render actual the right to wor-
ship of individuals and communities.").
294 Id. (quoting STC, May 13, 1982 (S.T.C., No. 24) (stating that such aid in fact
"offers the possibility to render actual the right to worship of individuals and
communities")).
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exercise of religion. The case for this reading of the Spanish experi-
ence is made even stronger when the Spanish equivalent of the free
exercise clause is read in conjunction with the section requiring state
cooperation with religious entities.295 Religious liberty achieves a
deeper meaning within the Spanish context because the government
is limited from infringing upon, but also positively charged with pro-
moting, religion itself. The Spanish approach seems to be saying
something like, to have genuine substance, free exercise must be
something fostered and supported, not simply allowed. This is signifi-
cantly different from the American approach.
What, if anything, do these differences mean? If it is assumed
that both countries safeguard and protect religion because religious
liberty is a human right and because religion, itself, is a good to be
fostered, then one must ask which of the two approaches best achieves
this goal. On the one hand, it can be argued that because the Ameri-
can approach minimizes the questions that the Court needs to ask
about religion, this is therefore better for religion because it reduces
the contact and friction between government and religion. The U.S.
approach reduces the potential for abuse. One of Justice Scalia's
stated concerns in Smith was that a broader conception of the limits
free exercise could place on government would lead to "a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself."29" The chaos that might
result from such circumstances would undermine constitutional order
and, therefore, necessarily affect the very religious liberties protected
by that order. But one wonders if the potential dangers against which
Justice Scalia warned are in truth so likely. Every conscience would
not become a law unto itself because not every dictate of conscience is
a religiously-based one.297 And, in truth, religious free exercise can be
limited for the peace of society and to ensure the rights of others;2"98
but Justice Scalia and the Court extend the circumstances under
which religious liberty can be curtailed to any and all situations which
the government deems necessary. By carving out a narrow zone for
religious protection, the Court seems to eviscerate the very meaning
of religious liberty.
The Spanish system of free exercise, on the other hand, sees the
right of free exercise not simply as a negative limit upon government,
295 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
296 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
297 Of course, this raises questions of separating religious-based motivations from
other motivations.
298 See DIGNITATis HUMANAF, supra note 94, 1 7.
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but as a positive obligation of the state to foster.299 In the Spanish
Constitution, freedom to exercise one's religion not only denotes the
right to hold certain beliefs and the right to act on those beliefs if one
has the means, but also the right to aid to make possible the actual
realization of that freedom.3 °11 Because religious expression is a true
good to be attained, the State must help individuals along the path of
its attainment. Judged against the backdrop of the goal of promoting
religious liberty, the Spanish system then seems closer to hitting the
mark of fostering and encouraging religion.
All of this might be indicative of a more fundamental difference
in each country's conception of the good of religion. Free exercise
can be seen as ensuring the ability of people to exercise religious be-
liefs-of protecting the "good of religion." But religion can be good
for different reasons. On the one hand, it can be good merely be-
cause people hold it personally and a society finds it desirable to pro-
tect deep beliefs whether those beliefs are in and of themselves
valuable-that is, the freedom of religion is merely an instrumental
good.- 01 On the other hand, religion can be understood as an intrin-
sic good; society desires its citizens to worship because such behavior
is fundamentally good in itself.30 2 Viewed through this distinction, it
seems that Spain values religion as an intrinsic good, whereas the
American system tends to protect religion simply as a mean to some
socially desirable end-simply because people have such beliefs called
"religion." This is most striking when we juxtapose the Spanish prac-
tice (required in law) of cooperating and supporting religion as a
299 This seems to conform more with the view put forward in Dignitatis Hlunanae.
See supra notes 278-287 and accompanying text.
300 See supra notes 78-21 and accompanying text.
301 Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen aptly describes the liberal approach to relig-
ious liberty. He writes,
Under the liberal view, religion is presumptively entitled to no greater pro-
tection than secular-rationalist claims to individual autonomy, and probably
deserving of less, because of its intrinsically irrational or anti-rational nature.
Religious liberty is not, on this view, a pre-constitutional inalienable right
that exists because religion is recognized as valuable; it is, rather, an instru-
mental freedom, granted only because not granting it would create larger
social costs. Thus, freedom of religion is not a preferred freedom, but an
anomaly to be hemmed in on all sides, in order to mitigate its perceived
anarchic tendencies.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, God is Great, Garvey is Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597, 1599 (1997) (book review) (footnotes omitted).
302 On religion as a good in and of itself, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAl. LAW AND
NATURAL RIGi-rrs 89-90 (1980) (discussing the basic good of religion). See also
DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 94, 6 (discussing the "moral qualities of justice and
peace" which flow from a "faithfulness to God").
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means to encourage free exercise, with the Smith decision where the
U.S. Supreme Court weakened free exercise protections. Smith recog-
nized no objective good of religion as such; in fact, one of the Court's
stated concerns was that allowing an expansive understanding of free
exercise would lead to practices which would conflict with law and
thus result in chaos. :40- One might counter that the uproar and legis-
lative action'414 since Smith are actually evidence that the American
approach has not yet abandoned the richer understanding of the
good of religion. Further, one could argue that the original American
constitutional understanding recognized the good of religion as such;
religious liberty, unlike the other liberties protected by the Constitu-
tion, was not an instrumental good but rather something good in-and-
of-itself. While speech might have received protection so as to ensure
free and open discourse, religion received protection because of the
inherent value of religion. Nevertheless, the current legal doctrines
that guide and shape religious liberty law do not seem to countenance
such a view, and certainly seem to fail to recognize the constitutional
patrimony. In contrast, Spain seems to avoid such problems.
None of this is to say that the Spanish system is without its difficul-
ties or dangers. Certainly, any approach which places obligations
upon the State in the realm of religious liberty, risks the entanglement
of religion with the state and the state with religion. Not only is this
potentially harmful to good government, this is also potentially deadly
for religion. Where the State interacts with a religious body, even
where it does not establish that body as the religion of the land, there
are temptations to intermeddle with the body's proper autonomy and,
therefore, the risk of detrimentally affecting the body's function as
religion. Also, a state's involvement in religion can ultimately coerce
people to choose one or the other religious body, or tempt the state
to absolutize the claims of one religious body over those of other bod-
ies, or of other secular philosophies within the state. These are real
dangers, yet, they are not insurmountable. Where religion and the
state are given proper autonomy, such concerns are simply not as
strong. Two bodies can be autonomous while still mutually support-
ing each other. That is, the Church and the state rightly have differ-
ent functions and goals. If each supports the other, this is not to
collapse the distinctions between the two bodies. In fact, as I have
303 Or. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (stating that a
broader conception of free exercise would create "a system in which each conscience
is a law unto itself").
304 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000)); see also supra notes
241-43 and accompanying text.
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argued here and as I believe the Spanish model shows, such coopera-
tion not only allows each to remain autonomous, it also allows relig-
ious liberty to become more fully what it is meant to be. These points
are more clearly seen when we look at the context of establishment, to
which we now turn.
C. Understandings of Establishment
The American and Spanish approaches to establishment and the
separation between church and state are very different. In the United
States, government aid to religion has been significantly curtailed in
recent history.30 5 In Spain, not only is cooperation allowed, it is man-
dated. 116 These differences are fairly remarkable.
An important point of difference manifests itself here. Under the
U.S. regime, religion cannot be helped as religion; the State cannot
cooperate with religion qua religion. Certainly, the state can help re-
ligion as a secular actor with secular goals. As long as it meets a strin-
gent test and avoids becoming too entangled with religion, the
government can give support to a religious body-but only where
there is a congruence between some secular aim of the state and some
non-religious action of the religious body.30 7 Notice how different the
Spanish approach to the cooperation between religion and the state
is. In Spain, the government helps religious bodies precisely because
they are religious. Religion is aided qua religion-because of what it
is, namely religious. And not only may the Spanish state help religious
bodies, it must help religious bodies.30 8 This is a constitutional man-
date, further concretized in the General Act.3 0 9
305 See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
306 See C.E. art 16, § 3 (Spain) (stating that the Spanish state must take "into ac-
count" the religious beliefs of the people and "maintain appropriate co-operation"
with the various religious bodies).
307 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (establishing the Lemon
test).
308 See C.E. art 16, § 3 (Spain) (mandating that the state cooperate with religious
bodies).
309 See General Act, art. II, § 3, reprinted in MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGIS-
LATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 42 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes
eds., 1998) (requiring the state to "adopt the necessary measures to facilitate assis-
tance at religious services in public, military, hospital, community, and penitentiary
establishments and any others under its aegis, as well as religious training in public
schools).
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Abstracting for a moment from the question of whether the Span-
ish approach is even constitutionally possible in the United States,3 1,
important differences become readily apparent. First, the Spanish ap-
proach to the establishment question recognizes an anthropological
fact about religion-namely, that religion is a social reality, which can-
not be relegated to the sphere of the individual person.I One pro-
fessor has deemed this the "principal advantage" of the Spanish
Constitutional approach to religious liberty.3 12 He argues that the
Spanish Constitution
recognizes religion not only as isolated within the confines of indi-
vidual conscience, but as a collective, plural, social fact. In other
words, religion, understood as a social reality, becomes a necessary
link in the exercise of governmental power. Given the state's recog-
nition of this social reality, civic authorities were then required to be
cooperative.3 ' I
There are three ways of understanding the social fact of religion.
First, it can be understood as a simple recognition that religion exists
within society-that there is this phenomenon called religion, that re-
ligion is a sociological and empirical fact. Second, it could mean that
religion is recognized as a phenomenon that by its very nature is com-
munal and social; that is, religion itself has social expressions and
dimensions-religion is not just individualistic. Third is a meaning
which sees that religion is not simply collective or individualistic, but
rather that religion and religious belief have necessary public, social
consequences for all realms of life; there are cultural consequences of
religious belief. The Spanish system seems to approach religion with
all three of these understandings. Certainly, under the Spanish con-
stitutional scheme, religion is recognized as a sociological fact, but
this is not the most important of the understandings. Spanish law
goes further, recognizing that religion has social or communal dimen-
sions by its very nature-dimensions which must be protected and fos-
tered by the State.i' 4 But the Spanish approach goes even further,
understanding that religion has necessary cultural implications. This
310 Of course, even if such an approach is constitutionally possible, it might be
politically impracticable. It is an interesting question whether such political aversions
might not be the cause of a regime that has privatized religion.
311 On this idea of religion as social reality, see supra notes 278-87 and accompa-
nying text.
312 Paz, supra note 26, at 693.
313 Id.
314 This is evident in the Spanish Constitution which requires not only that the
state respect the freedom of the individual but that state take into account the "relig-
ious beliefs of Spanish society" as a whole. C.E. art 16, §§ 1, 3 (Spain).
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can be illustrated by briefly examining the situation of the Catholic
Church in Spain. Not only does the State recognize or allow each
individual to hold Catholic belief and exercise that belief (the first
understanding),315 it also allows-among other things-taxpayers to
choose to support the mission of the Catholic Church with a portion
of their taxes (the second understanding).3 16 Furthermore, the mani-
festation of the third understanding is illustrated by Spain's allowance
and support of Catholic religion classes in the Spanish schools.
3 17
This is ultimately a recognition of the cultural and social implica-
tions of religion. Perhaps, the most fundamental of these cultural im-
plications is the manner in which religion is passed from one
generation to the next.3 18 Therefore, Spain recognizes that parents
must be given the right to hand on their religion to their children." 19
And that is not simply a negative right preventing the State's en-
croachment of parents' fundamental rights to hand on their religion
to their children; rather, it is positive right which the State must help
to effect.
It seems, then, that the Spanish approach recognizes that religion
is not solely a question of the individual's relationship to God; religion
is also about each individual's relationship to fellow believers in com-
munity; and that belief has necessary social and cultural implications.
315 See C.E. art 16, § 1 (Spain).
316 See Mordn, supra note 15, at 543 (detailing how taxpayers can choose to have a
portion of their taxes support the Catholic Church).
317 See Agreement Concerning Education and Cultural Affairs, art. 2 (B.O.E. 1979,
300), reprinted in MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS
58 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes eds., 1998) (mandating that
schools should teach Catholic religion while any individual may opt out of these
classes).
318 See, e.g., DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 94, 5. In Dignitatis Humanae, the
Catholic Church stated that
[t]he family, since it is a society in its own original right, has the right freely
to live its own domestic religious life under the guidance of parents. Parents,
moreover, have the right to determine, in accordance with their own relig-
ious beliefs, the kind of religious education that their children are to re-
ceive. Government, in consequence, must acknowledge the right of parents
to make a genuinely free choice of schools and of other means of education,
and the use of this freedom of choice is not to be made a reason for impos-
ing unjust burdens on parents, whether directly or indirectly.
id.
319 See General Act, art. II, § 1(c), reprinted in MINISTERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEG-
ISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 43 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Maria Martfnez de
Codes eds., 1998) (stating that the freedom of religion includes the right to "[r]eceive
and give religious teaching" and to "choose religious and moral education in keeping
with [one's] own convictions" for oneself and one's children).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
It is not clear that the American approach is able to reach this insight.
This is in part because the American approach sees the Establishment
Clause solely as a negative limit, rather than a positive opportunity for
the manner in which the government can interact with religion. 321
The Spanish approach, on the other hand, takes disestablishment as a
positive opportunity to embrace religious bodies in their fullness by
actively cooperating with them.
A second insight that the Spanish approach attains is that free-
dom of establishment does not necessitate a strict and formalistic di-
vide between the State and religious bodies. To aid, support, and
buttress a variety of religious bodies is not the same as establishing a
religion. That is, support is not the same as establishment. In fact, if
the state is supporting a variety of religions whose tenets-at least
some of them-are in conflict, it becomes a tenuous argument that
the state is establishing a religion. At that point, the State is not estab-
lishing a religion but establishing religions, in the equivalent of a
state-sponsored smorgasbord of religions. Might the more persuasive
argument be that, in a situation where the State cooperates with a
variety of religions, it is not in fact establishing or endorsing a religion
and its tenets but rather endorsing the larger principle that religion is
a good-a virtue-to be promoted and inculcated within society?
This is certainly not the same as establishing a'religion. And if one
returns to the deeper roots of why religious liberty is so valued-why
religion is given such an exalted place in constitutional regimes and in
the international discourse about human rights-it seems that this is
precisely the goal that framers of these protections hoped to effect.
Religion is a good that should be promoted and ensured.32'
At this point, one might interject that this is the very reason that
the American approach so strongly opposes the intermingling of the
state in religion. Allowing such an entanglement necessarily impinges
upon religious liberty; therefore, to enhance religious liberty, such en-
tanglements must be guarded against by our constitutional jurispru-
denceY 9 Certainly, one can agree that religion is potentially harmed
where one religion is endorsed to the exclusion of all others because
of the coercion this places upon citizens, impinging their free exer-
cise. But the same is not necessarily true of a broad-based support of
320 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (establishing the Lemon
test, which circumscribes the aid the government can give to religious groups).
321 See supra note 302.
322 See Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 510 (detailing the concerns present at
the founding, including worries about the "ravages of religious establishment" and
the effect such establishment would have on the freedom to worship).
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religions. 32z And, unless one makes the argument that the First
Amendment religion clauses were enacted to protect the state from
religion, it cannot be that actions which seem to promote and en-
hance religion in fact impinge upon religion in a constitutionally im-
permissible manner. This is especially true if religious bodies are
supported without discrimination.3 24 But, as we saw above, the princi-
pal motivations of the Establishment Clause were rooted in desires to
enhance and promote religion-to allow religion to flourish.3 25
Therefore, it seems that the Spanish approach in fact more closely
adheres to the original logic of the American method and, therefore,
more fully promotes the good of religious liberty.
A third insight, which is directly connected to the reasoning
above, is that present within the Spanish legal framework is an under-
standing that religious liberty can be more fully realized when religion
is supported and aided by the state. The method embraced by the
Spanish system is one in which the seed of religion not only must be
given the space to grow by the state but must also be watered by the
state. This is a controversial claim. Nevertheless, perhaps the Spanish
experience with religious liberty can help to answer American con-
cerns about whether the government can or should support religion.
One reason that establishment of religion was feared in the United
States was because of the effect it might have or could have upon
other principles of religious liberty.32 6 Establishing a religion or sup-
porting religions often leads to a situation in which religion cannot be
freely exercised. 32 7 By giving support to various religious bodies,
though not specifically endorsing a religion or making a particular
religion's tenets mandatory, the state seems to creep closer to estab-
lishment and to impinging upon the equality of religions. The free-
dom to decide one's duty to God in conscience becomes less secure.
323 There are, of course, extremely difficult questions about what constitutes
religion.
324 It is conceivable that where a select group of religious bodies are supported to
the exclusion of others, this could detrimentally affect the free exercise of those who
adhere to beliefs from the excluded religious bodies.
325 See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
326 See WrrrE, supra note 152, at 51 (" [T]he founders understood the establish-
ment of religion to mean the actions of government to 'settle,' 'fix,' 'define,' 'ordain,'
'enact,' or 'set up' the religion of the community-its religious doctrines and litur-
gies, its religious texts and traditions, its clergy and property.").
327 Indeed, among the concerns animating the founders was the fear that estab-
lishment could impinge on the individual's religious liberty. See Witte & Green, supra
note 150, at 509-10. Note, however, that this fear was in part motivated by an under-
standing of religion as "primarily a matter of private reason and conscience." Id. at
509.
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But this does not seem to be the Spanish situation. There, religious
bodies receive the support and aid of the state. In fact, with the arrival
of groups new to Spain such as the Church of Latter Day Saints, 328 a
good case can be made that religious liberty is actually flourishing.
The stronger case might be made that in a system such as America's,
where disestablishment has been read to preclude many forms of state
aid to religion, religion suffers.
A final note can be made here on a related but different theme.
Recall that in Everson, the U.S. Supreme Court spoke of the high wall
of separation between church and state.3 2 1 The Spanish experience
shows that separation of Church and state can take a variety of
forms-that it can fall along a wide spectrum. That the Church and
state are separate is not the same thing as saying that the state cannot
help to support, buttress, and enhance the Church (or churches). It
could very well take that form, but not necessarily. The two can be
autonomous institutions or spheres that still commingle-each sup-
porting the other to pursue its legitimate and separate goals. This
ultimately seems to be the lesson of the Spanish approach to religious
liberty. Incidentally, it is an approach which seemed to exist at least to
a certain degree within the United States previous to modern constitu-
tional doctrine.'3 °
D. A Necessary Third Comparison: Organic Connection Versus Disjunction
The very fact that the preceding analysis was split into a section
on free exercise and one on establishment suggests the bias of an
American comparativist. But, we can actually turn this bias to our ad-
vantage to push our analysis further. Though splitting the analysis
into these two sections helps us to more neatly engage the differences
between the systems, it also prevents us from seeing an even more
important difference between the Spanish and American approaches
to religious liberty. In Spain, the spheres of free exercise and estab-
lishment are not bifurcated and separated from each other; rather,
there is an organic connection between the Spanish understanding of
free exercise and those subjects that in America would fall into the
sphere of establishment questions (e.g., aid to religious entities, relig-
ious education in public schools, etc.).
328 See Martfnez-Torr6n, supra note 81, at 352 (describing the many Mormons and
Jehovah Witnesses who now make up the Spanish citizenry).
329 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (speaking of the "high and
impregnable" wall between church and state).
330 See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
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The preceding sections were evidence of this organic connec-
tion. 331 In Spain, governmental cooperation with religion and the
right to freely believe as one chooses are two sides of the same coin.
Moreover, the Spanish scheme also makes an organic connection be-
tween the individual's freedom to believe as he chooses and the con-
crete, social manifestations of that belief. To make freedom of
exercise meaningful, the state must give the individual and his relig-
ious community support, aid, and a proper zone in which to exercise
this freedom. "12  Because religion manifests itself communally and
because religion necessarily implies cultural consequences, the state
must positively reinforce these aspects of religion.333 But all of this
might still be insufficient to understand fully the Spanish innovation.
For within the Spanish understanding, religious free exercise is not
something separate from governmental support of religion (the realm
of establishment law); rather, free exercise necessarily includes gov-
ernmental support. That is, free exercise is both freedom for the indi-
vidual to believe and necessary responsibilities on the part of the
government to promote further that belief.
It is evident how profoundly different this is from the American
approach. In the United States, free exercise is connected to the zone
of establishment in a negative and tenuous way. State establishment,
including, it seems, much of the sort of aid that the Spanish state sees
as required, is prohibited partly because of the effect it might have
upon the free belief of citizens. 3- 4 But the law of each realm is not
tied together and has in fact developed separately and, at times, at
cross-purposes with the other.
In short, the Spanish and American religious liberty regimes have
very different understandings of the relation" between what, in the
331 See supra Parts III.B-C.
332 See, e.g., C.E. art 16, § 3 (Spain) (stating that the Spanish state must take "into
account" the religious beliefs of the people and "maintain appropriate co-operation"
with the various religious bodies); Mor~in, supra note 15, at 543 (detailing how taxpay-
ers can choose to have a portion of their taxes support the Catholic Church); Agree-
ment Concerning Education and Cultural Affairs, art. 2 (B.O.E. 1979, 300), reprinted
in MINISTERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 58 (Alberto de
la Hera & Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes eds., 1998) (mandating that schools should
teach Catholic religion while any individual may opt out of these classes).
333 Dignitatis Humanae states, "Religious communities are a requirement of the so-
cial nature both of man and of religion itself." DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 94,
4. It continues, "Religious communities also have the right not to be hindered in
their public teaching and witness to their faith." Id.
334 At least this was one of the historical motivations. See Witte & Green, supra
note 150, at 509-10 (describing the worry of the founders that establishment could
encroach on the religious freedom of the individual).
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American context, are the free exercise and establishment spheres. In
Spain, these are organically connected in a way which makes separat-
ing them nonsensical. In America, the two spheres are autonomous
and often end up pursuing contradictory goals.
E. The Story Being Told
Professor Mary Ann Glendon has spoken of law's educative and
rhetorical nature. She emphasizes law's "concern . . .with the right
education for citizenship.13 35 She realizes that the "idea that law
might be educational, either in purpose or technique, is not popu-
lar" 3" in contemporary times, but nevertheless stresses that law does
have a "pedagogical aim."3 7 Moreover, Professor Glendon believes
that law tells a story. She writes,
Whether meant to or not, law, in addition to all the other things it
does, tells stories about the culture that helped to shape it and
which it in turn helps to shape: stories about who we are, where we
came from, and where we are going.... Indeed, it may be that law
affects our lives at least as much by these stories as it does by the
specific rules, standards, institutions, and procedures of which it is
composed."""
For Glendon, the law is much larger than the rules, procedures,
and various institutions that make up its tangible form. Law is not
simply a set of commands or strictures; it is not simply the courts, the
legislatures, and the various legal associations that go into making law.
In fact, though not unimportant, these are possibly less interesting
and less important aspects of the law. More important is what the law
is saying by the things it allows or forbids, by the stresses or emphases
it places on certain things and leaves off others. Understanding law as
a story raises important questions: "[w] hat stories are being told [by a
certain body of law] at the present time? How do these stories affect
what issues are raised and treated as important and which are ex-
cluded from discussion or perhaps even obscured from view?" 339
These are questions directly applicable to the legal questions raised in
this Note. What does the religious liberty law of Spain and the United
States say about how each country values religion? What effects do the
stories told by each country's laws have? Are the stories told at odds or
335 MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 6 (1987).
336 Id. at 7.
337 id. at 8.
338 Id.
339 hM. at 9.
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in conformance with the stated values that are to be fostered by relig-
ious liberty law?
The Spanish law of religious liberty reveals much about the man-
ner in which Spain values religious liberty. The constitutional provi-
sions dealing with religious liberty send a rich and complex message.
First, religious expression is to be protected. This is made more signif-
icant when placed against the backdrop of Spanish history. The 1978
Constitution departed from years of religious establishment and sup-
pression.:3 4°1 Under these circumstances, the value of religious expres-
sion manifested in the law takes on significant importance. The law
expresses a desire for, and an affirmation of, religious freedom. A
second message sent by the Spanish Constitution is that religious lib-
erty is a communal good. Not only is the individual free to practice
his religious beliefs, but the state recognizes that these beliefs are
rarely, if ever, practiced apart from a larger community. Finally, re-
lated to this second point, is the message that not only is religion an
individual freedom that is practiced in a community, but that for this
freedom truly to have meaning, it must be fostered and supported by
the government and society. This is significant. The Spanish story is
that religious belief and expression are goods to be protected, but also
goods to be made better by the larger community's support.
This message is bolstered by the General Act and the various co-
operation agreements into which the government has entered with
religious bodies. The General Act again emphasizes the uniqueness
and importance of religion; it is an act that deals, not with all associa-
tions but with a specific kind of association, namely religious associa-
tions and entities.3 41 The cooperation agreements342 are another
chapter of the story begun with the Constitution of 1978: religion is a
good made better when the government helps it to flourish. At the
same time, the General Act, the cooperation agreements, and subse-
quent decisions in which religious groups are to be allowed to regis-
ter3 43 may well tell a story about what counts as religion. Recall that
the broadest benefits of the religious liberty regime have been ex-
tended to traditional religions in the Abrahamic patrimony or those
that confers to the "functional structure" of the Abrahamic reli-
340 See supra Parts I.A-E.
341 See General Act, art. I, § 1, reprinted in MINISTERIO DEJUSTICIA, SPANISH LEGISLA-
TION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 43 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa Marfa Martinez de Codes
eds., 1998) (describing the state's duty to safeguard the "right to freedom of worship"
in accordance with the Act).
342 See supra Part I.G.2.
343 See supra Part I.H.
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gions. 44 By favoring these groups and not others, the Spanish gov-
ernment paints a picture of which groups have value as religions and
which do not. This is possibly a significant shortcoming. Neverthe-
less, in the rich story told by the Spanish experience, there are telling
successes. Religion is not something that is private and individual, but
rather something that is very much public, communal, and that has
cultural implications. Religion, therefore, has a greater role in the
public sphere. Government helps to lend religion a certain degree of
legitimacy in the public square.
The story told by the religious liberty law of the United States is a
dramatically different one from that of Spain. The message sent by
the text of the First Amendment is certainly one that religion and
religious expression are valued. As the above discussion about the
motivations and principles of the Founders indicates, free religious
expression was a treasured value in early America, and one that they
hoped to proclaim as such in the First Amendment. 345 The text bears
this out. Religious free expression is protected and the establishment
of religion, which the Founders thought negatively impeded religion
as a whole, is forbidden. Yet, even facially, this language should strike
us as telling a different story from the Spanish Constitution. The lan-
guage is about the negative limits upon government rather than the
positive rights of persons and religious communities; certainly, some
of the principles and practices of the early times recognized a thicker
conception of what religious liberty meant, 3 46 but the story told by the
text, by the words written down in the First Amendment is drastically
different. Even if we take the Free Exercise Clause to protect an indi-
vidual right, its significance is just that-it protects an individual right.
The story told by the constitutional text is that religious liberty is an
individual right exercised alone in the deep wells of one's conscience.
While this is right on a phenomenological level, it is incorrect at the
anthropological level: persons actualize this right with others. 347
Such a telling however is missing from the original American constitu-
tional protections. At the same time, the Constitution says nothing
about the support of, or cooperation with, religion; according to the
original story of the Constitution, religion must go it alone.
344 See Martinez-Torr6n, supra note 81, at 348.
345 See supra Part II.B.
346 See, e.g., Witte & Green, supra note 150, at 511-14 (describing the Civil Repub-
licans who recognized a place for the state support of religion and an important role
for religious values in the public sphere).
347 See DIGNITATIs HUMANAE, suIpra note 94, 4 ("Religious communities are a
requirement of the social nature both of man and of religion itself.").
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Subsequent developments in American jurisprudence surround-
ing religious liberty have continued to tell a very different story from
that of Spain. The Smith decision sends a striking message. First, it
states that Free Exercise primarily protects belief rather than the right
to manifest belief in practice. - 4" One is entitled to his private, relig-
ious opinions. These religious beliefs or opinions, can manifest them-
selves only to the extent that they do not conflict with the law. The
story this tells about the nature of religion is equally striking. Relig-
ious belief and expression are bifurcated, separated. Religious belief
in this picture is fine and allowable; religious expression is more sus-
pect. This reinforces an understanding of religion as something indi-
vidual and private, rather than as communal and public. The story
told by Establishment Clause jurisprudence is quite similar. There,
the language employed by the Court in Everson spoke of a "wall of
separation"3 49 dividing religion and the state. Furthermore, the crite-
ria employed under Lemon to determine whether government interac-
tion with religion is permissible3 50 tell a story of religion and
government as bodies that are to be hermetically sealed from each
other. Suggesting that government support can only be for a neutral,
secular purpose, denigrates religious purposes. At the same time, the
establishment law further indicates that religion is not a communal
enterprise but a private one; public support of a religious body would
breach what is a personal and private choice of conscience. Even the
latest developments in Zelman v. Simmon-Harris35 1 indicate that the
Court and the American system have not overcome such difficulties.
Recall that in Zelman the vouchers were in part upheld because gov-
ernment money was given to individuals who could make their own
348 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (stating that free exercise
does not allow one's belief to trump a "'valid and neutral law of general applica-
bility'" (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., con-
curring)).
349 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
350 Recall that there the Court stated,
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative
criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion[ ]; finally, the statute must not foster "an
excessive government entanglement with religion."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted).
351 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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private choices as to how to spend the money.352 The government
program in Zelman was not supporting religion as a social reality.
Rather, it was further indicating that religion is private and merely an
aspect of personal choice. Overall, this suggests a picture of religion
as something from which government and society must be protected,
and as something private and personal having no bearing upon the
public discussion engaged in by society.
The stories told by Spanish and American legal discourse on the
subject of religious liberty are dramatically different. The former em-
phasizes the communal and public aspects (while not excluding the
understanding of the private and individual nature of religion) of re-
ligion and sees religion as a good to be fostered and promoted. The
latter emphasizes the private and personal aspects of religion (to the
exclusion of the public and communal) and sees religion as some-
thing from whose influence society must be protected.
CONCLUSION
Spain and the United States offer dramatically different examples
of legal discourse on the question of religious liberty. Though each
protects freedom of exercise and forbids the state to establish a relig-
ion, each does so in very different ways.
The Spanish method obviously cannot be adapted and estab-
lished wholesale here in the United States. Nevertheless, it offers ide-
als and aspirations for the American legal regime. If American law
wishes to foster the good of religion rather than simply to protect re-
ligious belief, then Spain offers an example of how more fully to real-
ize this. The open question is whether America desires to realize this
goal.
352 See id. at 652 (stating that where "genuine and independent private choice"
exists, a program is not as "readily subject to a challenge under the Establishment
Clause").
